The Spanish translation of Art and Objects has been published in Madrid, HERE.
What is a Philosophical Hack? The answer is quite philosophical. 🙂
But in this philosophy a number of things are challenged which then indicate that the hack must arrive from an aspect or element that exists which is not philosophical. This is a sort of truism: A thing cannot be in relation to another thing unless itself is first a thing. This is the problem with philosophy as we know it: Philosophy depends upon as it actively re-inscribes and enforces a particular regimen of power of bringing into existence the absolute truth of the universe; namely, in this case, everything is relative. Relativity is not a natural absolute and essential
truth that we come up on through our human ability of reason, it is a particular establishment of power.
One of the first imperatives of the philosophical hack thus must outline or bring into view not merely the postmodern critique of power which then ironically replays itself to maintain the systems of modern power already in play, and at that, as it is supposed to be bringing about emancipation or a removal from of that very power-state, but more how this power itself is not an omnipresent and omnipotent aspect of a fixed and closed absolute real universe.
Key is the disconcern the hack employs in its effort for truth. Not merely another power play of false promises but indeed a recognizing of truth about humanity and the universe in-itself. Indeed it is less a disruption than a revealing despite populism and identity politics.
The Philosophical Hack uses analogy with terms borrowed from what we know of science to describe the issues involved in being able to identify a thing that is called philosophy: Quantum physics is a project of physical description which does not comply nor answer to what we generally call classical mechanics. Quantum physics is nevertheless a viable and true manner (albeit theoretical) of coming upon –and application of — the world, but indeed its methods and concepts do not fit nor concord with classical conceptions of the world, even while quantum conceptions may explain the classical in manners which classical physics cannot reconcile or even agree with; both nevertheless function and operate.
Presently, philosophy is caught in a “classical” , or what philosophers have called correlational, mode, what I have called together as a true form of subjectivity (subject-object duality) to no longer challenge and to thus identify as conventional philosophy. The key to this move is thus to see that just as quantum physics does not negate, invalidate how classical mechanics indeed operates and functions, the identification (the operations of the hack) does not invalidate nor argue against the modes of conventional philosophy, even while it may challenge its method towards absolutism (in whatever forms its takes). Rather, the hack consolidates objects unto themselves by showing the weaknesses in the systemic facade. This move thus concerns an orientation upon objects because the hack allows conventional philosophy to be itself, as a thing in-itself to function as its does. The move is thus two-fold, unilaterally dual in its estimations and methods.
The book by Cedric Nathaniel is involved with the the first efforts to make visible what is invisible and sacrosanct to the conventional philosophical mode.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL HACK: The Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Event.
THE SECOND PART. Coming to a thought near you.x
“A Series of Footnotes to Plato”
Thanks Professor Harman.
This is been crossing my mind recently also, or at least similarly.
I have stated here and there that my concern is orientation upon objects, And I think sometimes people might mistake me being a sort of Graham Harman congregant. I Think that he has allowed for certain kind of resonance with his ooo. And perhaps this Resonance is akin to his “tensions”.
What is been going through my mind lately is the difference between, say, juggling And holding something that is difficult to grasp. These represent two ways of handling this thing that is Difficult to grasp or should we say even slippery .
And I think Harman is touching upon these two philosophical manners.
It is the difference between riding a wave, like surfing or body surfing, and standing on a Buoy. Neither is inherently more correct than the other for negotiating the ocean and it’s interaction with the coast line, but each gives a certain perspective and philosophically speaks to different aspects of the same situation.
Personally, I think there should be more clear delineation upon what any philosophy is doing for any presentation.
Taking a cue from Amorinblog, I am making an attempt to speak to the notion of disparities. Lets see how is goes.
What is terrorism?
When we think about the activities of terrorism, a marginal view might situate terrorism in terms of truth. What we have with the possibility of terrorism is a function of truth, or “true-Being”. In the consideration of what human beings do, we should not ignore or set aside this aspect of truth: Truth is Being truth. To set this function of human consciousness in terms of ‘belief’ merely reifies the Western colonial construct of subjective centrism, a construct that posits free will and choice in an absolute context of the ability for the subject to align itself with a transcendent course, such as we found in the American context “manifest destiny”. This is to say, we ostracize such “pre-terrorists”, people who might not have becomes terrorists yet they did, through the ideological matrix of the self-referential ethics of choice to say that the one who is a terrorist is choosing unethical behavior; the native tribes of the western northern hemisphere were for most purposes to the early American government, terrorists in every light, even though we understand now how the American “post-colonial” period was an unethical act (still we do very little to repair the wrong). ‘Choice’, and correspondent terms such as ‘free will’, can be understood as a Western liberal code for creating antagonism in the world, an aggravating aspect of Western capitalism and its war machine.
Yet see that the question is not one about an essence of choice. It is practically nonsense to suggest that we do not have choice. But at the same time, if we do not recognize a dual aspect of consciousness, then we always stay within the ideological paradigm of an absolute ethics despite how we might want to situate or define any other liberal ethics of inclusion; we will routinely stay in the unity of consciousness that is able to consider parts of itself, parts it conceives, the unity that appropriates plurality to its uses. Reflection, in this way, is misunderstood axiomatically to be witnessing something outside of itself. As part of the liberal ethical front (and I mean this to describe a kind of Western impetus, a certain manner of coming upon reality) we should not worry so much about what others are doing, in fact, we are only able to understand such ‘other’ through this antagonistic orientation that is first and foremost based in worry, fear, and philosophical resentiment. Ours is based in a contradicting antagonism, and our plight, as well as our ability to act, is based upon a cognitive platform of reconciliation in knowledge. We have then, as we are, to deal with our own BS if we are to ever stop jutting forth to then recoil in the usual modern oscillation of the war solution. In an odd sort of reprimand, the very idea of enlightenment typically does not translate into domination through war; no wonder colonial-exploratory Europe had to see other non-Europeans as ‘less than human’.
Two things here: This is not a argument against war or that we should not have war; this is not an argument for pacifism. Neither is this a suggestion that we should (somehow) withdraw from interacting with others; the point is toward an ability to be honest with ourselves about the situation at hand. As part of an ideological situation, we indeed have a front line; we cannot but be involved with a partition, of sorts, whereby we face and have confrontation with those aspects of the world in which we find ourselves. To move this understanding into any sort of utopian theme of ‘universal peace’ would then be to set aside our moment, our modernity, to basically negate our moment into a whole past to say then that all wars and conflict in history arose due to these constraints, whereas the truth of the matter is that which arrives only within our modern situation as wars stemming from these defined antagonisms: Basically we identify our moment by establishing the contradiction in this context. If we are ever to realize (which is to say, understand the truth of) our situation, then it seems the manner must take place within as the contradiction that is outside of the ideological or mythological construct, a situation that is not accorded to the construct to be thereby abstract (it is indeed occurring within the norm) but, is rather marginalized to the extreme, actively being withheld for the purposes of maintaining a particular kind of reality (ethics).
This is no longer a critique of meta-narratives; such a critique was still occurring in the antagonistic space, a space that could only be resolved through various ‘faiths’ that resolve the modern contradiction (the Deleuzian “Zen”, the New Age Spirituality, the Eastern Karmic cosmos, the “Christian” denominations that are not properly Protestant nor Catholic, and other discourses that take place in ironic suspensions). We have found that the critique of meta-narratives was how a particular ideological state perpetuates itself through ulterior colonialist motions. The Postmodern (but particularly the subsequent ‘method’) thought itself as an exception to the metanarrative, and used irony to suggest its difference, but we found that it merely supplied the ‘final’ narrative to substantiate Capitalism as the ground of real discourse (the “postmodern methodological platform”; see Lyotard “The postmodern condition”, and “The Differend”: The demand for a ground of real veracity, a limiting of irony, calls forth the criterion of ‘efficiency’ that brings about ‘experts’ to define what knowledge is valid, which knowledge is allowed to be considered as true, as well as the reparations that will be made to that aspect of knowledge that was excluded in the interest of efficiency.) But we were not done with irony, that is why definition is insufficient to bring about decisive changes in ideology; hence the various philosophical reconciliations for identity that we find all over the internet, and hence the instigation of a divergence in philosophy.
(Note: The question for divergence seems to be noticed. What others have been trying to do with ‘non-standard’ ideas and such, I simply address directly and say I am a philosopher and this ‘other’ manner of philosophy is still true as it can be identified thus conventional because the orientation upon objects by which it addresses things to gain its veracity. We do not speak from the unitive philosophical paradigm but rather admit that such a paradigm exists at least in parallel. Only one kind of argumentation exists which can reduce all signals to a single matrix, and that is the conventional philosophical route; it does not propose that it is capable of doing this, and that is why we are able to identify its mode with nothing. As I have said elsewhere, we are dealing with the instance of what stays static while something else changes, a calculus, of philosophical reckoning. What has withdrawn has indeed withdrawn beyond all argumentation: It has already been established. As well, any further argumentation is superfluous, redundant but indeed real and valid.)
So this is also not a critique of such identities. It is a describing of how humanity functions; we should not expect such understanding will change our behavior. It indeed will bring about or be involved with some sort of change, but the change will be related in a particularly real manner that seems to be able to avoid the truth of statements and yet likewise be able to argue effectively for how the truth is not what originally was there (a mistaken intension of intentionality). Neither is this a pragmatics, nor a promotion of a way into praxis. This is analysis, a possibility into a beginning of a science that has been brewing for some time (time is not the issue). The fact of atomic interactions is related to the war machine only through incidental, circumstantial yet real discussion, negotiation and argument; the science itself dealt only with the interrelating of factual situations, itself as a founding term that actually departs (instead of merely feigning departure). When we rely only upon a determination of human activity through this former method (of the circumstantial discussion) we arrive at never having the bomb built in the first place, no nuclear energy, no astrophysics, no understanding of our sun or the solar system, etc. No wonder there has been an effort to get back to the “pre-modern” Real thing.
We thus have now reached that point of discernment, an ability to deal with the being of human without recourse to incessant mythological justifying defaults that reify the free intuiting agent of transcendence. Thus far, we have not had a scientifically philosophical way to gain access into what human beings do because we were too busy doing it, busy using the manner; as an analogy, we’ve been like astronomers who have been looking at ourselves looking at the stars thinking we were actually looking at and discussing the stars: Through this approach we can only get so much information about the stars. The most recent of this manner is what we could generalize into a category of ‘Enlightenment’, but other categories that need be sorted are ‘State’ and ‘Capitalism’, among others, and “Neurophysiology” is not one of these primary aspects at this moment. We do not know yet how these function for human beings; we have only been using such categories in a proposal to find out how we might Be, indeed, using them to Be. In our finding this out, then, we have reached a kind of apogee in mythological function: Coming upon such self-reflection there by understands such knowledge as a means to enact, what is now/then seen, as a Truth. Only when this occurs does a moment arise by which to view through a larger frame of what has occurred. It does not occur through any choice in the matter, but indeed functions to begin to detract from itself.
From this moment we might be able to understand what ‘Terrorism’ might be. The first order of business, though, is to dismiss oneself from the reflection of identity, and this does not occur through any choice of free will. As I noted above, this is not a suggestion to indicate that terrible things have not occurred throughout human history, or that we can identify some essential human attribute or psychology to thereby alleviate us from such terrible occurrences. This is a description of what role Terrorism is playing in the reality of being human: Terrorism, in a large sense, is the antithesis of free will and choice; quite terrible. Psychology, at this moment, is too overdetermined in solution to be able to ponder a fact that does not move toward choices of human solutions; there are too many human issues in the world for an institution to consider bare facts; all such facts are ideological and political arguments that function as platforms by which to enact a possibility of real solution. It does no discredit to such psychological method to point out what it does, though, but the reaction that would take such a description as indicating a fault of psychology, or as suggesting that psychology is incorrect or wrong, is missing the point of fact for the sake of its ideological purpose, which is to rely upon the self-evidence of its teleology of real solution. Science concerns facts; real solutions are of a different order, of a different moment. And such moments are not, or at least do not have to be, at odds.
We thus make a proposal that seems almost a truism: Terrorism is the act that takes place from an ideological point of exclusion; terrorism exploits points of access.
I have suggested above that the idea (ideal) of human ‘belief’ is a manifestation of an ideological lack, a founding term that is supposed by the constituents of the ideology to account for what lay outside its purview. It is a colonizing ideal: Belief. Again, in this conceptual moment, we need separate ourselves from the notion that human beings all throughout history have been having beliefs. We are not concerned with what history might have to say about what human beings might “have been” believing (for indeed they were); that is of a different order of analysis. What occurs in terrorism is that the open door, that is supposed to be welcoming and inclusive of various human capacities and manifestations of belief, is not being taken. There is something about the welcome that is understood intuitively and innately to not be welcoming; to wit, the sensible response: My belief is not a belief, it is the Truth. Regardless of how we wish to emphasize our open ideal, in the case of terrorism, it has not worked, that’s why such acts are “terrible”, because they make no sense, they occur outside of our sensibility, our ability to make sense. Our sense of it is 1)that it is terrible, 2)unethical, 4)insane, 5) inhuman,6)of a ‘bad’ sort of religious fundamentalism. Perhaps we even make sense of the people’s acts patronizingly; they are ignorant, they are delusional, they are uneducated, they have been raised in an intolerant culture, they are the product of ‘bad’ ideology or psychology, they have been brainwashed. We cannot dismiss that any of these disclaimers may be the case, but for the act itself, especially individuals who willingly and with intent sacrifice their own lives in the act of terrorism – how else are we to make sense of such acts but through the unitive aspect of consciousness and its humanity that has good and bad psychologies accompanied by ethical mandates ? One cannot choose to escape their reality.
In these kind of reckonings there is no consideration of, as Alain Badiou has said, “difference as indeed different”, in other words, there is no considering their position for what it is in actuality, which is to say, as indeed a Truth that does not reconcile or fit snugly and comfortably in ‘our’ ideological nest. Indeed; I recently heard of how Donald Trump approaches foreign policy in a way that is different than what America has historically: Instead of attempting to defeat authoritarian regimes or dictatorships, reprimanding them with trade and alliance penalties, like the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, Trump approaches other nations on their own ground, allowing their political organization to function in whatever way it does so long as it does not interfere with American interests specifically. This appears very much like a situation where what is different is engaged with in its difference. How ironic that the person who so many in America see as contrary to American interests would be the person who would take an approach that can appear philosophically sound? I doubt Trump is that smart or educated, but it goes to show that we are not speaking about practical reconciliations of thought and action, but indeed a scientific description of the situation at hand. Could this be an indication of a possible beginning of a philosophical science that does not answer to conventional philosophical method?
Terrorism occurs at points of access. (Side note: The paranoia that often arises out of the consideration of an actual Artificial Intelligence develops the very point of access that an A.I. would be able to take advantage.) Terrorism is the revealing that access is not automatic nor guaranteed by any sort of discursive item, and that access now must be authorized (by experts). This is not homicide or murder, in as much as those events target individual people for specific identifiable reasons; e.g. Sam hates Pablo. Of course, we could see some similarities breaching this codification in the U.S. legalizing the corporation as an individual person: The experts tell us now that the human being is an incorporation, and not the other way around. It is not that corporations have become people, its that people must be incorporated to have ‘free’ access. In this sense, then, “in the name of (the True) Islam, I kill a number of symbolic representatives of the Christian West” is murder because this individual is incorporated (with an institution called ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-kaeda, Neo-Nazi, Free-Speech Movements, Pro-life, Black Lives Matter, whatever.. ). The irony, and the evidence that such terrorist groups see themselves through the lens they wish to destroy, is that they are asserting their freedom of access, pointing out the contradiction inherent in the (Western Liberal Capitalist) liberal mind set. This is the divine beauty of Capitalism: Its apparent omnipotence. Those who are not terrorists are those who are definably and axiomatically free to access: They are born incorporated: Nationalism has ‘bred’ itself into an offspring. Of course terrorism is insensible: How does one make sense of an act of assertion that positions itself against something that is already inherent to the act itself? This is the contradiction as well as the blind spot we find also involved in the critique of race relations. How much more non-sensible can it be for those who must behave through such ideological mechanisms? But this is not an issue of knowledge and education as much as it is what is occurring. The fact that such marginalized groups would have to speak about how to gain for themselves basic and inalienable rights is just about the most ridiculous thing that could occur given our ideological ground. Might the ‘terrorist’ actually be more sane??
This is not my position, necessarily, by the way, nor am I arguing anything about what sanity might be. But, an analysis of a situation must be able to point out facts about the situation if we are to get anywhere: Speaking about or describing what is offensive should not be taken as an argument for that which offends. A person of color is not asking me to change my skin color, reject my heritage nor deny myself as a human being in the world; she just asks me to be open to facing some harsh truths that come from outside of my ability to reckon on my own.
Identity has been taken to a further extreme, perhaps as a counterpoint to the extreme absence of sense that the act of terrorism evidences. I am not going to make an argument against that kind of reckoning, but only point out that such situations are about the political order. As to facts, if I may take the Islamic Terrorists as a case example (though we could put this analysis to any so called Terrorist), the suicide bomber is not targeting specific people, in fact, the hatred is entirely ideological (as I said): It is not Burt that I hate but that Burt is American, and he is not so much an American, as I reestablish the Truth of my sense, the sense of Truth, and re-appropriate to assert the Truth, as much as he is an Infidel. The point of access is a symbolic act against symbols, the scheme of which, on the part of the Terrorist, functions to reclaim conceptual territory (see my REBLOG post about conceptual territory) through lumping the antagonist into the counter-partial founding category by which a closing is understood as an opening (an act of faith); the corresponding ideal of the West is ‘belief’. The point of access is exactly the gap that opens up with murder without personal motive; the personal motive is the successful attack upon Truth. It is no secret that the opening for belief allows for all sorts of ethical compromises that brings into question every ‘belief system’ that functions under its umbrella. Only in the “blasé” attitude (Walter Benjamin ?) that accompanies the pursuit of real identity may someone have a valid ‘belief’; one must suspend their ideals in ‘nothing’ in order to ‘really believe’ (or to have faith). It is this kind of nihilism that is terrified by someone who is willing to die to destroy even the smallest piece of the antagonizing ideological leviathan; the transcendence that accompanies the modern nihilism is of a different sort than that usual Western ideal that places religious thinking in the category of concern with a transcendent ‘creator’. The Western religion of nihilism (the state of belief) cannot bring itself to have any sort of passion strong enough that would allow itself to willingly kill itself; how ironic. Here we even have the beginnings of a philosophical explanation of addiction, as well as the reason why it has reached epidemic proportions in America; but as well, a possible explanation of China and how it becomes present in the West.
The point of the terrorist act is to destroy the antagonistic state, the state that directly confronts the Truth through the ideal of human belief (the ideal of ‘belief’ is a singular ideological Truth). The terrorist act thus is an act that is already admitting what it is losing; like the Kamikaze fighters of World War 2 Japan, Japan had already lost the war, but would not admit it. Slavoj Zizek speaks of this kind of ideological instance in the analogy of the cartoon character, say, Wile E. Coyote, chasing the road runner off a cliff, running out into the air. Coyote does not fall until he looks down and realizes that he is standing on nothing, and even then, he has time to wave good-bye to the camera. The interesting part of this, though, is that the terrorists are already a part of the ideology that they are terrorizing, because they are already admitting that this antagonistic state has a claim in their Truth: They are fighting against the ideal of belief, an ideal concept –like that which is unstable within Anslem’s argument for the proof of the existence of God, — that they already and inherently understand; we might see the contradiction suspended in the terrorist act in as much as they destroy their own lives in the process of attempting to destroy the whole of the antagonistic state: A ‘not-life’ for a ‘life’. Likewise, they know that their act will not actually destroy the whole of the infidel’s kingdom, but perhaps (who really knows) they ‘believe/know’ that their act will cause some sort of cascading event of collapse, as their disruption in concert with the ongoing series of disruptions will inevitably achieve their ideological goal, which is to dispense with ideology (as belief). We might see again a similar ideological activity in the events of Helter Skelter, ,where the murders of Hollywood celebrities would instigate a race war. Such antagonisms supply the fodder that ironically sustains the Capitalist ideology.
Terrorism could be marking that point when Capitalism has run out in to the air; perhaps it is now waving to us, but I doubt it. If I have to summarize the point of this essay on terrorism, perhaps it is that terrorism is an ideological construct that has its basis in nothing, an irony, because while it destroys people, actual lives, it is already serving Capitalism as a source of capital, of “magic”, of supplying energy to the ideological fetishized commodity that is identity: Terrorism is understood effectively, axiomatically, automatically to be identifying a real-true thing. Disgusting ethical juxtaposition really, but again this is why Capitalism could be said to be the umbrella Religion of Nothing, because people have to have faith in order to be able to ignore the incredible depth of the nothingness in which such events, and their labels, induce.
It is within such determinations that we find necessarily that I am not speaking of a unitive situation, but indeed, I am speaking about how such a unitive situation operates.
I could go on, and there is a further bit having to do with explosions, but Ill leave it here for now.
REPOST of THRE-POUND-BRAIN’s no results for ‘Cognitive Psychology of Philosophy’
and reply and reply, of Baker question, then my answer…
(please check out his full essay and the comments if you are intreated in the whole thing)
April 13, 2017 at 9:30 am
“I don’t think I get it. So the racial theories of the Nazi’s were appropriate to the particular kind of being they were interested in?”
April 13, 2017 at 11:00 am
“The issue is not whether there is ethical value. Of course there is.
The issue is involved in the arena where I am not disagreeing with you. Don’t get me wrong; I live for disagreement and argument; I work to be shown where I am incorrect; to me, that is the point of discussion. But the point of contention is how it is that I can agree with what you are saying, yet, somehow, you defend against me having that understanding of you, as if how I am agreeing with you is based on an incorrect appraisal of you.
I am playing with the idea around how Foucault says it in the intro to “The Order of Things”. Basically he says in one of the last point there, that he rejects the idea of some transcendence, some sort of spiritual or consciousness that resides apart somewhere. He thus is one of the first (I think) to actually say that he looks at things as upon a horizontal plane.
I agree with his sentiment, so far a existentialism in the larger sense goes (not necessarily as the academic category goes). Discourse is all we are dealing with; there is nothing outside of discourse that we are able to deal with. OOO and SR and such are good religious apologies, but I get into that elsewhere.
So, if this is the case, if there is no getting outside of discourse, then there is the problem of agreement. We get into the PMs then.
See, I notice that you are and have noticed the same things and issue that I have. and even much of the conclusions you come to are so close, but then I find that you fall into, what I might call, a kind of dogmatism that excludes me from understanding you, that it appears you place as a condition upon your rhetoric so to keep me from you, or to uphold a kind of exclusionism.
I think PeterJ could be onto something with his latest comment.
But I think it is more that meaning itself, discourse itself, does not unfold or present itself upon a inclusive plane. Discourse itself may set upon such a horizon, but then we get into (as you have noted here and there) heuristic problems. But I think it is in this moment, at this juncture that you may be pulling the ‘non-transcedntal’ clause down to blanket and protect your ‘personal heuristic’, so to speak, As if, to use a non-phil idea, in the last instance you deny all that has come to you to bring a certain ‘open-ended’ conclusion, and ‘close’ the meaning.
To me, this is a methodological maxim, a procedural constant of what is ‘philosophy’. It, as Laruelle, ‘relies upon a prior decision’ in order to establish identity.
Perhaps this is why I wonder about your science. Science, as a pure kind of endeavor (never mind Latour right now), just ‘does’. The identities is deals with are not philosophical argued but are grounded in a different kind of ‘substantiating material’ than that of philosophical identity. This is why philosophy is not ‘wrong’, it is merely ‘doing what it does’ and is also why I call for a clearing up of philosophy, its domain, and what problems it is capable of addressing.”
And, yes. The racial theories of the Nazi’s were appropriate to the type of Being they were interested in, which we could say, is the Being of the Spirit which is now destitute in its approximations.
Discourse may function upon a horizontal plane, but it is downright Un-ethical and offensive to understand Hegel in his more blatant presentations.
I find often that philosophers love to complicate everything and then turn around and tell you its simple, and then write a paper that uses all sorts of jargon. 😉
I think many philosophers dont even know any more wtf they are talking about.
One might want to say or think that object orientation came about due to various really in depth analyses of philosophical texts. They are wrong.
And this is not ‘realist’ or OOO. It is merely sensible given the matter at hand.
Here is a very unconventional talk, presented in a quite rebelious, anti establishment manner, about not only the reasoning behind object orientation, but also how object orientation diverges from the conventional philosophical reckoning.
(Please bare with the slow start.)
I feel it is time to clear the air; the smoke of post-modernism still seems to linger. It is time we come to terms with what Post-Modernism means, what it meant, what it is.
There is no debate in this; any debate that would uphold a sort of PM catch-all has missed the issue. I think it is this apparent problem for which I address by suggesting a divergence is warranted.
Post modernism is a manner of dealing with reality where metanarratives fail. PM Is a response to the failure. But in that it is merely a response, it must itself be based in a metanarrative, albeit and however unsure and undisclosed as it may be. But we need no longer hesitate in this mire of indecision and doubt. Where the post-modern is indeed necessary, it often fails in that it wants to repeat itself, to reify itself, to eternalize itself; ironically, this is a Modern trait that Post-Modernism attempted to confront.
So it is we may see many authors attempting to place this indistinction, this temporal hesitation. This is where Bruno Latour attempts to make an opening: So the PM metanarrative, itself a kind of ‘unconsolidation’, might find the meaning of the void (but only void by virture of the Modern metanarrative, or the metanarrative that is modern) where by PM finds its ability to call into question metanarratives by allowing what has been silent to speak.
The task now is to find that narrative that accounts for the, now twice avoided, silence; which is to say, we need admit that we all have been colonized despite PM, that PM is was an ironic vehicle to establish and reify Modernity.
Perhaps an apparent geology, what mane are calling the ‘anthropocene’, will snap us out of the magical glamour of PM ironic transcendency, and stop fantasizing that ‘I’ have some sort of communion with ‘un-god’, some ‘extra universal’ situation. So we can get back to some sort of ground.
I have read and am somewhat familiar with 4 of the (in)famous PM authors; Michel Foucault, Jean Francios Leotard, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida. Of Baudrillard Ive only read tiny bits here and there. Virillo ive not heard of. Of course, there are other PM authors that are not so famous that I have read, and even some that are not considered ‘post-modernist’ but yet are speaking of similar issues.
While i do like and understand these PM authors i have read, i also see that Lyotard was probaly the best at seeing through history. Foucault, oddly enough, was caught in a ‘vertical’ dynamic even as he posed a ‘horizon’, and Deluze was still too high, too near to the event to be able to see past self centrism. And also that at least Lyotard and Deleuze are mis-appropriated as they are mis-applied; this last is the issue Alain Badiou and Laruelle address, as well as Bruno Latour.
It is or should be a fact, by now, that the nature of humans is to have real worlds, or a Real world, as the case may be. The issue of all if not most of many of the Big Names, as well as many smaller names, of the past 200 year of philosophy, but maybe even longer, is the difference involved in what might be called ‘truth baring’, and ‘reality baring’ operations. Every great philosopher addresses this issue, but the issue of this issue is how the telling of the ‘first’ issue often finds itself awash in the second issue, the effect that Badou describes and addresses. Yet these authorial addressings, these worlds, are, in effect, metanarratives.
There is a disentanglement of philosophy that must occur if we are to even get anywhere, if we are to stop having ‘turns’ and ‘eras’ and such. But if we must swim in this pit of eternal denial, then we can say that in a certain sense the Post-modern wanted to propose some sort of new reality, but alas we find that PM was no different than the realities anywhere else or any time, and that this is the fault of the second appropriated issue. The difference lay only in the terms that are used. Derrida said good things about discursive limitation, what for other terms is indeed the Modern/Post-modern paradox, but he too was caught in a vertical situation likewise that inevitably puts him in a modern sorting, which is to say, of a metanarrative. As a witness to this paradox, Lyotard, I’d say, was closest: The ‘post’ thus was is not meant to be some temporal suggestion; more, it was is a description of a situation and its logical defaults based within the ‘modern’ discursive scheme. Yet, that people took and continue to take it as some sort of historical era or attitude, thus shows that mis-appropriation as mis-appropriation (denial as showing what is true) is of the issue of the second type.
I say PM is more about orientation upon objects than it is about some attitude or argumentative position. What I see of PM, and Lyotard specifically, is he was come upon by his experience, his metanarrative, of himself, and found, through an engagement with history, through what is already established for by to bring what is true and real unto a person, with the discourse of reality itself, that his metanarrative could not be justified by this real discourse; upon reflection he finds that what constitutes himself is different than what the metanarrative says of himself and what he should be. This his issue presented in his book “The Differend”. So, ironically, because of this situation, he saw that indeed the discourse by which he came (comes) to know himself is incommunicable, because he must use the discourse that is already there, and by this usage avoids that which he is trying to communicate. This juxtaposition of Being, thus allowed (s) him to bring a critique against the discourse that is not ‘hearing his case’, and thus calls this critique ‘post’ modern, because the real discourse is, or is seen as, ‘modern’ and the metanarrative that is incommensurate with this modern is thus post, or after, posterior. He thus finds this ‘modern’ reality involved with meta narratives (as he was involved) that are ineffective yet being used in a behavior as if they are effective, which is to say, communicating, and moves to expose this ‘human’ facet by (ironically) critiquing it; that is, not only critiquing the metanarrative by which he comes unto the world, but the idea of metanarrative itself. He there by opens the door to the removal of the subject, and the entrance on the scene of the Object, or what has been developed ‘post-post-modern’, SR and OOO and such.
The problem, though, is always the setting aside, forgetting, and then plain mis-appropriation of the ironic paradox. It is not so much that one needs to write with some subversive or double meaning, but that the irony of the situation by which one comes unto reality must remain intact. As even Nick Land seems to notice; one must come upon a certain type of knowledge that orients one upon what reality is, what the case of reality is, such that a critique of reality stems ultimately from an honest confrontation with that route by which one is coming upon that very reality. And this is to say, one confronts ‘the world’ by attacking the basis by which he or she has the world; to segregate the issue into some objective world and some subject-agent-operator is of the second type of issue.
This is the issue at hand, as well as the feature that distinguishes the reason why we need to ‘clean up’ philosophical discussion, as well why I advocate a kind of divergence.
Some one posted a comment to this post of mine, to which I replied, but then I made it into a new posting.
You can check the comments of the original post here:
“We will find, inevitably, as a kind, that the only things that change are the objects of our view, and not any ‘essential mode’ of being human. Humans do not change; only its world changes. There is no’grasp’ that links these forms, but that of a present faith, a present sort of ideological religion.”
…and here’s my new post:
Yes. That is one type of essential reduction . Thank you . The furthering question is what is happening that this is not apparent; that is, as it often has to be taught. And more: That it sometimes doesn’t have to be taught.
The reason why I say ‘one type’ is because there is only a certain type of reasoning that would say that an experience has any essentially true relation to words, which is to say, terms. Where there is an essential linkage, there we find an essential agency, a sort of ‘central and foundational’ effect. But in truth, any word (term) can be found to uphold the same tenants of being. I can say ‘consciousness’, but any term could be used and find the same types of meaningful organization, a same typeof scheme. The example is the Copernican universe. It is not that the sun’really’ exists at the center of the solar system; this is just a mathematical convention that makes easy sense. In fact we could construct models that place any point-object in the universe at the center. Hence, this means that there are only objects.
The problem with saying ‘consciousness’ and or ‘awareness’ is that one usually tends to associate these discursive foundations as meaning actually foundational and essential things. Hence they are directed toward more a ‘use’ and ‘practicality’ than what should be otherwise an actual truth. For people who need or want a way to mitigate the mental and emotional issues such as anger, fear, and general life difficulty. It is proper then that we can say they are Real,because reality has to do with essential practical linkages of meaning.
But a more deeper sense finds that there was s no ‘foundational’ or central ‘thing’ that is ‘me’ or ‘my consciousness’ behaving in any way unto itself, that is, as a sort of ‘spiritual being’ that is sufficiently segregate from some world to be able to ‘have’ an effect upon or within some world.
The fact is s that in the consistency that is an unsegregated being, there is still the apparent world there, no matter how I might come to terms with it, no matter what experiences I have about some truth. Ina certain sense, this is what Samraj is saying about consiouness, but if we don’t stop there, we might find that it is not really consciousness at all.
This then brckons an investigation beyond the mere phenomenon. Because now, all that is left, is being here now, and the doing of it.
There is a return that occurs though. Once we get beyond that fantastic experience of some intervening deity, move past the awakening of the divine center, we are left with an experience that is somehow more than the experience, what can be said to ‘exceed’ what could considered human experience.
But we must be careful here: What most often and typically occurs with this move of excess is an impossibility of meaningful reconciliation. Rather; usually all one is left with is a back pedaling to either (now) Real Things, aka empirical science , ‘speculative’ imagining, or a kind of spiritual fundamentalism. But both of these as part of the same move, or the move of the same, mere reenact the repetition of the terms of theoretical discourse, and will end again at the same points.
Hence, what is actually excessive is a kind of historicity where two routes of the knowing human being are exposed, two routes that do not reconcile in reality for a ‘more real’ or ‘more true’ truth.
The New Realism is just that: A manner of justification for a new reality. No big deal; its cool. I just wonder how critical they go. What is their purpose. Well, an intro to Toms book goes like this:
“In the 20th century, phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy ‘back to the things themselves’. But phenomenology has always been haunted by the spectre of an anthropocentric antirealism.
Tom Sparrow shows how, in the 21st century, speculative realism aims to do what phenomenology could not: provide a philosophical method that disengages the human-centred approach to metaphysics in order to chronicle the complex realm of nonhuman reality.
Through a focused reading of the methodological statements and metaphysical commitments of key phenomenologists and speculative realists, Sparrow shows how speculative realism is replacing phenomenology as the beacon of realism in contemporary Continental philosophy.”
(From Edinborough University Press epub site)
I cant help but wonder: if i was in advertizing, would i not say advertizing things? I mean, is the advertizer saying things about humans? More to my point, why do advertizers only say things about advertizing? I think most would say that the Ad-er say things about humans through looking at the fact of their Ad-er ness.
So, what is the intro to this book saying? And in as much as it is being tallied as a Speculative Realist book, what is going on here?
“In the 20th century, phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy ‘back to the things themselves’. But phenomenology has always been haunted by the spectre of an anthropocentric antirealism.”
Perhaps I am not well read, but the fact that such a statement has been made shows a particular orientation upon reality. This orientation sees itself as the last word in things because it falls within as it takes from the established manner of coming to truth: power in numbers and the generation of numbers through indoctrination; which is to say, conditioning through reward, the reward of towing the party line. Now, this is not to say it is a wrong route, merely that this is what the route, as a necessary mode, does: It argues against that for which which it cannot account. But more: Because most people cannot understand what is not already given them in advance, together they create a common state that justifies that inability; i.e. They form a ‘gang’ (lol), or, they form a group to enforce against what is offensive to the group.
In this case, the blatant calm by which this statement is made exhibits the obviousness that is taken for granted; the group has such reach, a member of the group can say almost anything they want without fear of rebuttal because, again, in this case, all route for rebuttal is assumed as it is enforced.
“…phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy back to the things in themselves. ”
This statement shows that the author of it does not expect that the thing in itself is what is being proposed by the Speculative Realists. It suggests by its saying that somehow the SRs are saying something that moves beyond “the 20th century phenominalism”. In other words, the commentator (at least) is involved with seeing that terms have an ability to convey things that are actually true, but somehow never get to the thing in itself, and so the SRs are supposed to have given up on such phenominalist reckoning.
Does anyone else see the problem here?
It is so annoyingly frustrating to have to wonder how SR could have ever gotten off the ground considering that the SRs are supposed to be so informed about philosophical ideas. It seems blatantly obvious to me that these SRs are being deceptive in thier proposals.
“… speculative realism aims to do what phenomenology could not: provide a philosophical method that disengages the human-centred approach to metaphysics in order to chronicle the complex realm of nonhuman reality.”
How is this possible? How is it possible to be human and not use a method that is human centered?
Does anyone else see the problem???
One of the problems is the SR occupy a space so privileged that they cannot and will not entertain critiques.
The philosophical problem is that the reason why these SRs can be so confident in their speculations is because not only do they rely upon a critical post-modern maxim, that discourse determines as it reflects reality, but that this maxim is enforced.
I don’t know about you, but there is nothing about discourse that I can see that anywhere determines what is real, except that there are these “philosophers” that say it’s does, and or use discourse in a manner that proposes to be determining reality differently that some proposed ‘before’. It is a hoax, a con perpetrated upon the world through a particular methodological assertion of power, for the purpose of allowing them thier position of power.
The mode of these SRs is that they argue as they accept that the power is ubiquitous and thus no longer interesting to talk about. So great, as I said: The discourse that views the Ibjects from a one sided and obvious real orientation is necessary, yet also inherently avoids its counterpart because it is assumed to have been already addressed. But thier mistake is that phenominalism is taken to be that counterpart — but it is only the counterpart to what is Real because such Phenominalism likewise proposed upon what is Real, as what is real exists within a particular ideological horizon that is enforced against offense. In as much as the Realists make notice, they form a precipitate Invisible to their view.
This is all to say that somehow there is a traditional interpretation of what philosophers were saying, that this interpretation is taught as toward and from a position of free thought. This confinment of teaching thus also produces a certain type of thought, a certain type of conclusion. Hence we can see that this statement (above) can make a proposal of method because itself is based in a particular methodological arena wherein types of method may be discerned.
Yet, such as it is, this move of SR merely affirms that a divergent mode of philosophy has become necessary, and this is to say that contrary to the mode that says that discourse is intricately involved with the reality, the SR Reality is indeed also necessary, but in a manner that leaves at least some of their proposals, their route, exposed.
Much of these Realist proposals are merely a philosophical fad likeclothes and music; this Realism is a career posing, a thinking for thoughts sake, art for the sake of the artist. Yet that there is clothes and music never changes; what people wear may say something of the time, it thus says something of reality, but then true to the above statement’s assertion of phenomenology, it also resists an “anti realism”. Yet it is the limit of traditional interpretation of phenomenology that indeed produced phenomenology, of Hursserl most probably, but the antirealism that has arisen by which our current Realism arises is an anti realism in the context of the phenominalist reduction — which posits itself by an anthropocentrism, I.e. By the limit that is the human centric universe. It is this interpretation that yields the Speculative Real route, but the route that is concerned only with what is real because what is real had been determined by the route to be the only sensible thing to be considered.
These folks do not consider that it is the spot that is missed, that which is not real that allows for the platform by which an investigation into the object can even be considered viable. It is the nature of what is not real that allows for reality to be situated upon the object in itself unto itself, such that objects can be said to have reality unto themselves.
It is through the phenomenon that what is real may be determined along a particular vector, but due to this, what is real is not the only vector.