As a former grad student in theology, the history of theological education can be broken up into two genres: theology (as a philosophic-intellectual …
As a former grad student in theology, the history of theological education can be broken up into two genres: theology (as a philosophic-intellectual …
I think this will be the last energy I spend on JP. The less energy given toward his name the better, I think. But one last thing…
I think we can have little more doubt that JP is supplying a new philosophical ground for Christianity; indeed, I might say that he is a theological philosopher. And in an even more honest light, that he is the example of what I call the Postmodern Religion: the manner that religion appears today, the way it behaves for the modern state.
We might wish to be carefully observant.
Peterson is not really understanding the philosophy that he sounds like he is. In particular, from what I’ve listened to of him, (which is about 4 hours all together) he is not really understanding the philosophy is poses to be, despite all his rhetoric, and in particular, the main antagonist of his position, Postmodernism. Specifically, he is taking general ideas of the subsequent postmodern distortions and stretched application and further misapplying them as he is indeed misunderstanding them. Yet, I am imagining that because he has a PhD and a nice suit, and can put sentences together about various abstract ideas to a certain sensibility, he then appears as though he is making sound judgements and assertions. In truth, though, it appears that he is overstepping his academic license in the name of the Postmodern privilege of subjective dishonesty, which he projects upon a straw man that he calls ‘Postmodernism’. He in indeed utilizing Postmodern methods of appropriating discourse for his own agenda, the exact theoretical method that he decries as belonging to his straw man Postmodernism. He is capitalizing upon his alienation from a theoretical space, and then using a rather “sewn-together” version of half-cognized meanings to assert the truth of his subjective power (white male) as though they indeed have valid theoretical bearings. As I said in my last post, this is a particularly postmodern (in the diminished sense that he uses and understands) maneuver.
This is why I am and have been beginning to elaborate upon the a kind of philosophical orientation which recognizes various types of philosophy. Peterson’s “type” of philosophy is one which demands that all conceptual paradigms must be able to be conceived by everyone who has a certain level of education. This coincides with his “absolutism” that seems to rise into everything he has to say; biological essentialism, nationalism, civilization, history –everything to him has an essential and eternal basis. I question this maxim for the exact reason that I am indicating here with Peterson: It is his inability and indeed insecurity around being an academic which does not allow him to admit nor even see that he is simply not comprehending the theoretical arena that he appropriates. Again; this is exactly the situation that the Postmodern authors warned us about; in particular, Jean-Francois Lyotard, who basically gave us the term postmodern, tells us that knowledge is no longer something that raises or falls upon its own merit, but indeed, knowledge is something that the experts prop up. Implicit in this description of our situation is that experts thus demand an equivocation of knowledge to the standards defined by the experts. Peterson, someone who has achieved the title of expert (PhD) does not have the (what one would figure accompanies advanced education, as much as it obviously does not) humility to view something he desires as outside of his conceptual register, because of the systemization of knowledge (technology).
We might look at who supports what he has to say. It appears that Nationalists, racists, white people, and hetero-normaitive Christians form the bulk of his supporters. If he is so concerned with people’s well-being, why does he decry government support for LBGTQ+ politically valid designations? Might we do well to look at what he considers “mental health” also? Reality and truth that he appears to promote likewise has little philosophical support beyond some sort of assumption of a common human who is civilized. And what history exactly is he drawing from to come to his conclusions about society and the human psyche? To me, it appears rather arbitrary and, to be frank, quite similar to the artistic latitude that Freud used for his speculations about the structure and history of the psyche, such as his infamous story of the progenitor. Also, I think it is kind of strange, like a psychoanalytical flashback to not-so-long-ago when homosexuality was officially listed in the DSM as a mental dysfunction., that Peterson advocates so liberally for the democratic tenet of free-speech, yet while also advocating that people have “responsibility” for their lives. It seems to me there is a therapeutic inconsistency somewhere in there. Let him be so free about the possibility that what he knows so surely could be wrong; let him take responsibility for the world and not just his world. hmm? Perhaps have some therapeutic care as a psychologist? Indeed, in my profession’s code of ethics as a counselor, and probably his as a psychologist, (maybe thats why I am not a psychologist: their ethics are a bit out dated maybe, but maybe not) it says that the psychologist shall not impose his or her biases upon the client. In my profession, I am not ethically nor legally allowed to impose my religious beliefs upon the client. If I do, I can lose my license. Likewise, if I am an atheist counseling a Christian, I must not treat the client as though they are stupid or something. And, if someone is Gay, trans or whatever, I am not to impose my sense of personal correctness, as Peterson’s “natural honesty for identity” which says that such people are being dishonest with themselves. If I do, then I can be sued and lose my license. Wow.
There are no free rides, nor simple ideological solutions — he even argues this himself !! (watch the video a few posts ago). It appears that he is advocating the very thing he argues against.
I think his intensions are in the spirit of helping people, which is good. But, when we notice how he draws from history to construct a sensible history — which, upon scrutiny, is filled with many philosophically inconsistent holes –we might want to reference a history somewhat recent to our knowledge, that of Nazi Germany.
Now, I do not mean to be alarmist. But it is well known that Hitler and his propaganda machine drew upon a distorted version of idealist philosophers such as Hegel and Nietzsche, and used this misappropriation of ideas with a particular analysis of history which might have made sense to many people of Northern Europe who were looking for some respite from the depression of the defeat from the First World War. Hitler and his minister of propaganda, Joseph Goebbels contrived a mash-up of Aryan, Nordic, and Christian myth, which served to unite the people of Germany under a kind of mass hysteria of national pride, all the while propping up straw men under pseudo-scientific “truth” who were identified responsible for the decline of the German Nation. Jews were made to be responsible mostly, along with their “degenerative democratic” news reporting, but all sorts of people who did not fit into the propped-up mythic ideal were seen to be less than human.
Now, of course, in the small of it, this is just another philosopher speaking his philosophical wares, so hey…
But we might want to learn from the past: so many people were taken for a ride and then found themselves in a terrible space of problem that they did not even know they were supporting.
Just be aware.
That said :
Part of the Two Routes is a suggestion that we admit that there is no common humanity, but that there is a humanity that needs such an ideal. I think perhaps Peterson is playing to this crowd. The issue , though, is to develop a philosophical understanding that understands this role, the responsibility Philosophy has to the actual truth of what humanity is by what it does: People need religion. And so the responsible thing seems to be to give it to them, but also to recognize that the religious ideas of “partial reasonings” are in the service of compassion for the common good, and less “true” about what is actually occurring. Less a patronizing, and more a recognition: most people simply do not wish to know, and to give them all the information sometimes just confuses people and makes life more difficult. I think it is possible Peterson is doing this, trying to supply a meaningful world to those who don’t want to really know, but without the awareness that this is what he is doing. We need people who are aware, not just in a power struggle for righteousness.
They’ve done it again: another embarrassing moment for the skeptic movement
— Read on platofootnote.wordpress.com/2018/12/23/theyve-done-it-again-another-embarrassing-moment-for-the-skeptic-movement/
From the Philosophical Hack (out soon):
Laruelle’s is the ‘best’ conventional proof of what cannot be proven through the conventional method. I have already spoken about the distinction between Laruelle’s and my terms. Laruelle distinguishes his project by asserting a positive withdraw in reference to the real common occurrence of philosophy, to call his Non-philosophy a state that purports to communicate this alternate unity (that he calls “real”) must be more real, yet in terms by which its placement is ultimately a contradiction of the ‘philosophical’ terms; whereas mine remains in the positive stance to indicate philosophy as the proper domain of the issue, I then refer to the common occurrence of philosophy as conventional. He likewise implicitly, if not explicitly, asserts that his Nonphilosophy is a better or ‘more true’ statement of what is actually real, where as I simply place reality with what is common,. What is not common, in my view, thus, in reference to this common state, not real. The true issue with Laruelle’s Non-philosophy is it falls into so many contradictory and accusatory pitfalls that it is basically and ironically non-productive to discuss what he could possibly mean as a philosophical position (ironically, it is called non-philosophy); but his point is aptly illustrated despite the easily discerned conventional problems. The most overt of these problems is that in order to agree with his proposal to be able to argue from it, in most conventional cases, one must inevitably and ultimately end up using exactly his phrasings; this is to say that regardless of what anyone want to argue about the veracity of his proposals, an extended rebuttal of his ideas will bring the proponent to have to quote him exactly as a responsive defense. This facet brings accusations of the religious quality of his (non-)philosophy; because the only way to argue with his proposals is to use his exact definitions, which then denies that the rebuttal has any grip on what could be an effective argument to the contrary. The end result is that one merely understands what Laruelle is saying, but really there in no point in arguing his points (as a proponent of them), except that the proponent might then be less a philosopher than a religious convert. The ultimate point of his (non) philosophy thereby can argue the religiousness of conventional philosophy as a whole, because often enough, the same will apply by extension. Thus, we can safely say that to argue his (non-)philosophy without quoting him exactly or using his exactly phrasing or having a firm working knowledge of his definitional lexicon is to misunderstand what he is saying, which begs the question if indeed he is living in his own personal and isolated reality –for how are we able to ground his assertions in any experience but his own except to admit he is a kind of prophet? Thus his position, though valid, represents a condition of philosophy itself that is best “passed over in silence”.
The point of this explanation is to indicate the ridiculousness of taking what can be seen as the most rigorous presentation of non–philosophy as if it is indeed a philosophy.
Also, it shows in relief how my explanation will be said to not understand what Laurel is saying, for various philosophical reasons. Then, ultimately, we will find that there is nothing one can say to the people who consider themselves “non philosophers” to tell them anything about how they might be a little off in their reckoning, so it is best just to let them be on their own, Being, as they are, so correct in their ideals.
The Zizekian Horror of Spielberg’s “Ready Player One”
I might add another twist￼.
The emancipatory narrative that accompanies a critique in the sense of some sort of ethical compromise or the “Hidden meaning” underneath the overt presentation of plotline and set, Can itself be seen as a posture which wants to move towards emancipation. The problem then is that such a discourse falls into the same critique that it gives upon, say, this movie “ready player one”. Namely, that the critique, or the subject that is doing the critique, is emancipated, that he has been able to pull himself out of this “false dichotomy” which critiques elements of the screen presentation as though from a position beyond or above or otherwise better than what is being presented on the screen. The critique it self thus implies that there is some manner of understanding that will allow the center of the gaze, The gazing subject, to remove itself from the problematic ideological confinement.
What no one really wishes to remember, to bring into reality with them, is that there is no effective communication from outside of a situation. Rather the effect is dominance, one way communication of intention. The presumption involved in being able to communicate into a given situation from a position that is outside of it it’s called feudal sovereignty in one sense and colonialization in another. What comes up in the condition of emancipatory politics currently is the ideological residue which is proposed to be solved in the effort of critique. The discussion of race relations, for example, knows that critique only sets the stage.
This is the perpetuation of irony that people on one hand think they’ve gotten beyond or that it’s a thing of the past or some particular philosophical era, and on the other hand informs their very ability to progress in some ethical manner while remaining outside of the repercussions of that intervention, which is to say, of that correction from sovereignty.
We should’ve learned at least 30 years ago that the way situation is able to be affected in a positive manner is to find a way into the system, yet without the reasonable default of an out. Though necessary in the political environment, we cannot withhold something of ourselves in going to the front lines; we cannot all be generals sitting in our offices directing troop movements. Perhaps our problem is there is too many generals and not enough soldiers.
So it could be that and even more introspective critique upon this movie is that the goal should be that of getting the prize, because then once having gained entry into the system we might actually be able to do something about the problems it presents. So long as we withhold something from the system and propose to enact a correction upon it from outside, we have done little more then to enact and ethics of Emancipatory politics which has its roots in the colonization from sovereignty. There can be no emancipation without this sovereign element; what is at issue could concern why it is we all not only want to be kings but think we deserve to be?
The problem could be not so much that everyone goes after the prize, that this is something bad or something incorrect in the system, so much as it is the view about what the system is enacting and what the prize actually means or amounts to for the system itself.
First the repost:
Perhaps it could be said that politics is that which occurs at that precise moment that we learn to count to Two. If this were the case, then it would follow that not everything is political. Everything can become political, but politics is something is something that must be made to be. When is it […]
Then the comment, which is an extension of my previous two postings:
…that God’s purpose is to bring about Its own destruction, evidently, obviously and finally. So that the world becomes the second thought.
With reference to this repost, the shift we enact that defines the divergence is exactly the move that exposes the ‘second’ of the this repost’s essay, of the Zizek reference and the bunny-duck thing. The point is (the repost above, here) that there is this second world that is not recognized by the ‘one’ world. But indeed that argument falls at a crucial point: It is not just not recognized, but such a second is a second that is only theorized about for the purpose of maintaing the ‘one’ of the First but under different terms, as if it is not merely terms changing.
Hence we have at least some evidence that the ‘one’ which is proposing toward the ‘second’ world is doing so as a sort of magic, a slight of hand: Established on a theoretical theorem that reality extends no further than discourse and that discourse is reality such that effecting discourse changes reality, the one world distracts attention from its target, which is the reification of the one world, by givng lip service to this theoretical second.
But see; if we have been following my blog, my essays, we should glean that indeed discourse is all there is but it is ones orientation upon the terms that is at issue. The issue rests firmly in the assertion that there is one proper manner/method of appropriating discourse; what i call the conventional method.
Hence we must expose just how the conventional method maintains its power of truth in the face of its fallacy, and this is done by having that whichis second not by virtue of the oppressing assertion of discourse itself asserting its primacy in the place of the displaced one. Thereby does the destruction of God equate and show that the theoretical second is but an object of the transcendent clause, which is to say, a truth of reality established through faith.
The second, while ressonant in the first, as we see in the essay about Barths comment on Romans, defies the first in its very nature, which can be said in this case to be discourse, but not merely some ‘flat’ discourse, rather what is now indicated by the meaning of two routes.
You know, for the most part, philosophy is pretty damn boring. I think that’s why most people don’t read it or like it. But then there is a certain type of intellectual who likes the puzzle part of philosophy; they like the creativity , to watch the eloquence of problem solving, the twists and knots and the various interesting ways people can undo through spelling out.
While it is interesting at times to watch how people solved a certain problem, mostly to me, the mere puzzle solving is boring, pedestrian, mundane. It is impressive sometimes, but no more than a gymnast. Maybe that why I’m not so into sports. I do like watching the actual plays, and I got my team I root for and know a tiny bit of the politics and larger seasonal bracket strategy and stuff, but mostly it appears to me so routine and uninteresting, slightly entertaining, but mostly like listening to pop music. Sounds nice but oh so BORE-ing!
So maybe I gave myself away.
Philosophy is interesting to me when it verifies and confirms what I already know. Sounds lame and self centered doesn’t it. Well, it is just this type of verification that so rarely occurs ‘out there’ that allows for people to understand what I’m saying as self centered. And that’s why it is interesting, because so very very few people really understand what philosophy is: The only way it verifies to me what I already know is by conveying a meaning that apparently so very few understand.
Fkg stupid, huh.
Take the example of music. Pop music is so very boring and lame, as well as POP-ular because it is doing nothing interesting. It is mundane repetition. Sex for fucking; beats for moving; lyrics for saying the same thing everyone else is saying; sound for getting loaded; bliss in vacancy. Worship for fashion; security for money. New new new from old old and blah shit crap.
Now this is never to say that I think Ratecliff’s song. SON OF A BITCH is not catchy and even pleasant and danceable, more that it is a product first and art second, of having only the ignorant bliss. It is identity and dumness before authentic relation. It is flat music. Don’t get me wrong ; I’m pretty dumb and sometime music is just there to be dumb to, but the mundane human interactive world of bs I just had to leave, even almost before I entered it.
I am an artist because art is first; and what comets next … Well, pop music never occurs without some sort of social investment. There is no choice in being socially involved. Sometimes you just gotta accept things.
BUT on a slightly different tangent…
What prompted this post and then got keel-hauled into the above non-sense is : maybe it’s the translations:
Derrida is like reading folk music. Ive been browsing through a book of his essays and I remembered why I never really got into him. I’ve read enough, mind you, to know that he is merely repeating what I already know, but now we should be looking at how philosoohers say it. He is quite interesting in as much as he has to be included in what is interesting, but honestly, he’s kind of a pussy. Reading Derrida is like reading poetic mush about the beauty of a sunset. You can’t account for taste.
( yes; I do write mushy poems, but I don’t usually like to read them by other people. But wait: My mushy poems aren’t mushy though; they are sincere. There is a difference. Sincerety is not boring, but sincere poems can be nauseating — and not in Sartre’s sense! )
Derrida puts all this poetic mishmash literary image-while-still-being-scholarly stuff. It’s like listening to folk music. It’s nice. But, lets be real: kinda embarrassing. At least now it is. And again, don’t get me wrong: some of the folk stuff I did (or maybe do) listen to and like, but I was quite high then (am I now?) and upon awakening…. I dunno, I guess I’m not as poetic as Sarte and Derida. (I talk out my ass sometimes).
Heidegger is like listening to classical music, a lot of marching though. Even though he might be talking about poetic stuff, he still evokes a sense of passion with heart, but not the bleeding heart kind. He speaks with authority (ironic, huh.) moving, pulsing, turning, peaking, dropping.
Zizek is like Lenard Skynard or Arosmith, or even Led Zeppelin. As many have said, Zizek the rock star. He bubbles literary guitar hero solos.
That’s all I got right now for the philosopher-music analogies.
But, I dunno; I think maybe what is needed now is a little punk rock, a little Hendrix metal, a little hard core Dead jam philosophy. And the great thing is: it can’t be faked.
I’m sorry, but some of these academic types, it’s like theve never partied. Never actually been crazy.
But I’m a judgemental fuck.
I probably don’t mean any of this.
The New Realism is just that: A manner of justification for a new reality. No big deal; its cool. I just wonder how critical they go. What is their purpose. Well, an intro to Toms book goes like this:
“In the 20th century, phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy ‘back to the things themselves’. But phenomenology has always been haunted by the spectre of an anthropocentric antirealism.
Tom Sparrow shows how, in the 21st century, speculative realism aims to do what phenomenology could not: provide a philosophical method that disengages the human-centred approach to metaphysics in order to chronicle the complex realm of nonhuman reality.
Through a focused reading of the methodological statements and metaphysical commitments of key phenomenologists and speculative realists, Sparrow shows how speculative realism is replacing phenomenology as the beacon of realism in contemporary Continental philosophy.”
(From Edinborough University Press epub site)
I cant help but wonder: if i was in advertizing, would i not say advertizing things? I mean, is the advertizer saying things about humans? More to my point, why do advertizers only say things about advertizing? I think most would say that the Ad-er say things about humans through looking at the fact of their Ad-er ness.
So, what is the intro to this book saying? And in as much as it is being tallied as a Speculative Realist book, what is going on here?
“In the 20th century, phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy ‘back to the things themselves’. But phenomenology has always been haunted by the spectre of an anthropocentric antirealism.”
Perhaps I am not well read, but the fact that such a statement has been made shows a particular orientation upon reality. This orientation sees itself as the last word in things because it falls within as it takes from the established manner of coming to truth: power in numbers and the generation of numbers through indoctrination; which is to say, conditioning through reward, the reward of towing the party line. Now, this is not to say it is a wrong route, merely that this is what the route, as a necessary mode, does: It argues against that for which which it cannot account. But more: Because most people cannot understand what is not already given them in advance, together they create a common state that justifies that inability; i.e. They form a ‘gang’ (lol), or, they form a group to enforce against what is offensive to the group.
In this case, the blatant calm by which this statement is made exhibits the obviousness that is taken for granted; the group has such reach, a member of the group can say almost anything they want without fear of rebuttal because, again, in this case, all route for rebuttal is assumed as it is enforced.
“…phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy back to the things in themselves. ”
This statement shows that the author of it does not expect that the thing in itself is what is being proposed by the Speculative Realists. It suggests by its saying that somehow the SRs are saying something that moves beyond “the 20th century phenominalism”. In other words, the commentator (at least) is involved with seeing that terms have an ability to convey things that are actually true, but somehow never get to the thing in itself, and so the SRs are supposed to have given up on such phenominalist reckoning.
Does anyone else see the problem here?
It is so annoyingly frustrating to have to wonder how SR could have ever gotten off the ground considering that the SRs are supposed to be so informed about philosophical ideas. It seems blatantly obvious to me that these SRs are being deceptive in thier proposals.
“… speculative realism aims to do what phenomenology could not: provide a philosophical method that disengages the human-centred approach to metaphysics in order to chronicle the complex realm of nonhuman reality.”
How is this possible? How is it possible to be human and not use a method that is human centered?
Does anyone else see the problem???
One of the problems is the SR occupy a space so privileged that they cannot and will not entertain critiques.
The philosophical problem is that the reason why these SRs can be so confident in their speculations is because not only do they rely upon a critical post-modern maxim, that discourse determines as it reflects reality, but that this maxim is enforced.
I don’t know about you, but there is nothing about discourse that I can see that anywhere determines what is real, except that there are these “philosophers” that say it’s does, and or use discourse in a manner that proposes to be determining reality differently that some proposed ‘before’. It is a hoax, a con perpetrated upon the world through a particular methodological assertion of power, for the purpose of allowing them thier position of power.
The mode of these SRs is that they argue as they accept that the power is ubiquitous and thus no longer interesting to talk about. So great, as I said: The discourse that views the Ibjects from a one sided and obvious real orientation is necessary, yet also inherently avoids its counterpart because it is assumed to have been already addressed. But thier mistake is that phenominalism is taken to be that counterpart — but it is only the counterpart to what is Real because such Phenominalism likewise proposed upon what is Real, as what is real exists within a particular ideological horizon that is enforced against offense. In as much as the Realists make notice, they form a precipitate Invisible to their view.
This is all to say that somehow there is a traditional interpretation of what philosophers were saying, that this interpretation is taught as toward and from a position of free thought. This confinment of teaching thus also produces a certain type of thought, a certain type of conclusion. Hence we can see that this statement (above) can make a proposal of method because itself is based in a particular methodological arena wherein types of method may be discerned.
Yet, such as it is, this move of SR merely affirms that a divergent mode of philosophy has become necessary, and this is to say that contrary to the mode that says that discourse is intricately involved with the reality, the SR Reality is indeed also necessary, but in a manner that leaves at least some of their proposals, their route, exposed.
Much of these Realist proposals are merely a philosophical fad likeclothes and music; this Realism is a career posing, a thinking for thoughts sake, art for the sake of the artist. Yet that there is clothes and music never changes; what people wear may say something of the time, it thus says something of reality, but then true to the above statement’s assertion of phenomenology, it also resists an “anti realism”. Yet it is the limit of traditional interpretation of phenomenology that indeed produced phenomenology, of Hursserl most probably, but the antirealism that has arisen by which our current Realism arises is an anti realism in the context of the phenominalist reduction — which posits itself by an anthropocentrism, I.e. By the limit that is the human centric universe. It is this interpretation that yields the Speculative Real route, but the route that is concerned only with what is real because what is real had been determined by the route to be the only sensible thing to be considered.
These folks do not consider that it is the spot that is missed, that which is not real that allows for the platform by which an investigation into the object can even be considered viable. It is the nature of what is not real that allows for reality to be situated upon the object in itself unto itself, such that objects can be said to have reality unto themselves.
It is through the phenomenon that what is real may be determined along a particular vector, but due to this, what is real is not the only vector.
When we are too close to an event, we talk about it as from a distance. That is, what we say is automatically distanced from the event, a maximum distance. The event is thus, by this occurrence, an object. As opposed to our psychotherapeutic model, the closer we are to an event, the more dishonest we are about its true bearings, that is, the truth of the matter, why it is that the (the wholeness of the) event has occurred the way it has. The impetus and the reaction can be come upon as an included item, a truth in-itself, only when we are distanced from the event. The truth of an object, as opposed to the True Object, can only be viewed in its truth from a distance. The equation is thus of inversion, of ratio.
Here then we may have a basis upon which to properly view foundational post-modern writers, namely, Derrida, Deleuze and Guittari, but others also. To wit: Their descriptions were from a basis too close to the event, such that they attempted to quickly and finally establish a ground for the event; the event being thus so profound and significant, they were compelled to offer a reason.
They were not wrong, only rash.
It is analogous to an explosion. We have now the data from the explosion, having encountered it ourselves, but also come across the initial first hand rationalization and fact crunching reports of the explosion itself – with that, subsequent explosions, and now the reports and experience of the aftermath(s) of explosions, we can now safely report upon the truth of the whole event.
Nonsense! Ridiculousness! The usual suspects rage.
So now we need to try and reel it in. If the fish has been snagged by the line, then we need to start to bring it back away from the fish of mere ideas, back from objectival discourse that sees authors and their ideas as True Things to be apprehended in their in-itself-ness, where the fish was swimming around looking for food and found it on the end of a hook and decided (whether it be of ‘natural’ instinct or not) to bite — we need to bring back the fish that has been snagged by the line.
See that this is not a rebuttal of Object Oriented Ontology; rather the distinction that finds OOO accordant with the divergent move is an occasion to speak about the Significant Event. To say that our issue concerns one’s orientation upon the object, and to further delineate that reality concerns a faith in the True Object, is actually the converse of Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, and not its ‘opposite’ that would be then the ‘subject orientation’ necessarily.
To explain: Our thesis involving the pocket veto has implicated the Speculative Realists as dealing with reality in reality. If we have not been explicit, theirs (but Graham Harman in particular) is concerned with closing the ‘gap’ that appears to separate the subject and object in an extended discursive analysis based in traditional Western Philosophy, the gap that appears poignantly with Kant; Harman speaks about “how two objects touch”. Yet we should see that the primary concern that appears shaded if not explicitly avoided there is how to bring the subject individual human being into direct relation (contact) with the object. Harman moves for a leveling of the playing field by categorizing all real things, including the human being, as objects. The notice enacted here is that there was a previous discursive situation that presented a conceptual structure for reality that allowed for the gap. Thus SR divergence in this first sense, a real divergence.
What we should then see is that it is the subject-centered ‘reason’, ala Quentin Miellassoux, by which we may come to an idea of how one in reality is oriented upon objects, because it is by such subjective centrality that objects may be presented as such. The issue is put forth in the essays of Constructive Undoing as having to do with subjects, human beings, that are oriented upon True Objects. This is to mean that the individual of reality sees and references itself by and through Objects, and because such Objects cannot be known in-themselves, i.e. known as True in the sense of giving to us information about them that has nothing to do with our (subjective) perceiving or comprehending them, neutral data, so to speak, their Truth, the Truth about objects that we take and behave with as if they indeed are absolutely True is an act of faith. Such it is that reality in itself is a manifestation of faith. Hence, a divergence in a second sense that distinguishes what is True from what is real, that is, what is ironic from the faith in the True Object.
As shown in part 7 of this essay, the significance which links these two senses of divergence is the show of power. Specifically, it is the basic real assumption of post, but at least, post-post modernist assertion, that discourse determines reality. We have outlined how Miellasoux frames this in his ‘Correlationalism’, the weak and the strong forms. What is divisive (if we can follow the same type of categorizing for divergence) in the weak sense, is that such reality, if we may use this in the strong as well as weak correlational sense, already assumes that discourse does indeed reside as the omnipotent power for reality, so much though, that it is assumed and proposed given to include even our ‘innermost’ person, the makings and structures of our thoughts, such that there is no human being that is not determined in its manifestation as well as its moves (read: choices, options for movement) by discourse, that indeed discourse had and has determined what reality is. It is by this correlation that we have discussed the ‘individual of reality’ that is the individual of faith in the the True Object, and have thereby offered the strong divergence that succeeds from what we have called the ‘hard’ correlational limit.
It is by this designation that we argue the SRs are dealing with reality in reality; they are subject to the hard correlational limit, and thereby diverge from the previous determination of reality, the ‘subject orientation’ to the proposed new determination, ‘object orientation’. Due to the hard correlationalist model, because they were are already invested in reality, where the weak and strong correlationalism functions, they were already dealing in their being oriented upon the True Object. Hence the irony involved with Harman, at least, noticing this limit and finding his vector back in the limit to find and discuss what this True Object is, how it manifests in reality as reality. He is discussing the ‘subject as object’ and the real ramifications of this move. So it is also that what he is finding and what he is saying evidences the significance of divergence; both its weak and strong moves evidence the pocket veto.
We have come to an odd point that is in fact so odd that the fast reader might even miss it; I say ‘fast’ and immediately indicate the point of contention. Either this odd point is not so odd but is noticed as capable of being odd, or it is rejected. What is really odd though is if it has been rejected, we can account for it: the rejection is based in the assumption of (a prior posterior maxim, an experience of which is given prior to the experience) the real common humanity of individuals of whom the reader is part and in which the reader is invested through his her identity. The rejection is so commonplace of reality that the fast reader misses it, and often misses that a rejection has even been called for, and this is because the rejection is based in the maxim that all individual human beings have available the resource of intuition; so to say, as the previous segment Part 7, that Miellassoux has come by his argument by intuition is to say nothing more than he is a human being. Yes; this is true. But the point here, as we discuss the point of contention, is to say that which everyone assumes as true, out loud, to their face. It is to point to what it is we say is real and to elicit a reaction where what is revolutionary has been missed. The point is to expose that upon which the assertion of a unitary discourse of the real gains its stature, and thus be able to begin to speak that which historically remains silent; to indicate that what is missed cannot be ‘re-placed’ as another discourse of method that says it is now ‘practice’; to indicate not merely that while what is missed is indeed missed by its objectival understanding — even as what is ‘radical’ poses as this space, or the revolution that is proposed by this space, this ‘missing’, this ‘indivisible remainder’ (Zizek) — and is indeed the ideology functioning as ideology, is the discourse ‘working’ (Heidegger, the Work of Art) as it is supposed to as the condition of reality as knowledge, but more significantly, that such ‘indivisible space’ is in the ‘pocket’ of real discourse, in one case as potential but in the other rather as completely missed; and this is to say, again, the rejection is the evidence of consciousness functioning to supply reality, of distancing the individual from its object through identity, consciousness ‘denying’ that the True Object is not just true-real.
While the conventional (real) discourse may evidence its own saturation of meaning in terminology and thereby be able to slice and mash, dissect and describe, deconstruct and recombine term-object singular identities so to bring about a sufficiently dense description of the picture of reality and to thereby gain purchase upon a new solution to the old, this method of process never gains its object beyond the mere Kantian intuition of true meaning gained by the terms that are poised in faith to avoid their own objectivity; at best, such a method succeeds in describing the ‘reality of the moment’. What this means is that the same discourse of reality that discounts any real ‘god’ through its argumentation is allowing for its ability to grant or convey truth by relying upon a transcendent yet unspeakable power that is denied in the asserted and apparent power of discourse to convey its truth (God does not exist/ there is no God and the atheist position in general). It thus becomes obvious why there have been arguments made as to a particular definition of ‘existence’ that excludes some ‘actuality’ of God, to justify why we can thus say ‘God does not exist’ and be truthful in as much as there is a ‘truth in God’. The ‘speculative’ only gains its (Aquinas) stature as such by virtue of the ‘practical’; by virtue of the speculative itself, it is not speculative, but rather indicates what is not practical except that it has to be distinguished because what is practical is ubiquitous to (common) sense, or for another word, reality. Hence, we can begin to speak again of — not merely duality, but more so, dual bases of power that do not combine but instead evidence the limitation of a discourse that proposes itself in the human act as the One omnipotent and ubiquitous truth.
One world is necessary. The problem is what this world is, but if we have more than one world then what is the ‘whole’? Many are already discounting such a question; so let Reality be said to account for the one world; for all the problems that arise whether mental, social, psychic, material, physical, etcetera, all the scenes and issues are dealt with through a reductive method that finds a solution for the question of what we are to do, so that every solution is a momentary manifestation that defines for humans their place of activity — this ‘one place’ where a reduction of meaningful categories amounts, is reality, and the argument that would attempt to displace or discount this proposal, a real argument. This necessary situation of humanity is thus contingency, every situation is contingent upon another situation. This place is ultimately a place that settles for consciousness its own operation in its operating. There is no manner of thinking upon things that can remove the fact of thinking about them (as far as we can think we know of thinking), so let us grant that to offer any notion whether subjective or objective or any of the proposed philosophical turns and solutions is always a notion of consciousness in the attempt to place itself in the real world; it is the same with thought. The only way to avoid this feature of consciousness is to deny this feature, and this is also a feature of consciousness; what is reductive, as to method, is based in denial, and the place where reduction occurs to find solution as to what to do is called reality. That method which relies upon such a denial of operation for the sake of the reliance is what we call conventional, since it is the appearance of the world that takes what is presented as the common arena of human effort for the sake of the One thing to be addressed and solved. Every proposal of how such reality is manifested is a discursive strategy for approach based upon meaning and significance. Hence, to argue that the world is constituted through objects, and only objects, is a particular solution for how consciousness has been placed and is being placed in the world for the moment. This argument then is ironic, for it begs its own question of how it is able to come to such a conclusion for all argument, which is to say, for all reality; it is the expression of contradiction as meaning, as opposed to contradiction indicating limit.
It is this feature of human process that now arrives in a necessary divergence. For within such a framing, which is a real historical discursive framing whereby various proposals have been offered and challenged through the method of determining truth by the criterion of contradiction, the world as we know it or have argued has brought us to the place where our ability to offer solution is seen to be merely a vanity, merely consciousness doing its universal operation — and this is denied. What has occurred here then is consciousness through its own function of creating meaning has come upon its own process as transparent, that is, the meaning is that it only makes meaning and this meaning has no true basis beyond the establishing of true objects (identity), regardless of any necessary objectival in-itself point of reference, and distanced itself from this meaning. This issue then is called the point of contention’, for the issue concerns not only reality and how it functions — the contradiction is overcome by faith –but also reality as such that it is distinguished now as another object in itself.
Reality is conventional; divergence ironic. The former sees progress instilled and innate in the meaning of every statement, whether it be for or against, the stasis of term-object identity in an historical temporal discursive movement of and toward the One truth, whether it proposes to be gainable or not (for the assertion that it cannot be gained is likewise an assertion upon the progressive nature and ability of humanity, that we have through trial and error found that this is the case). The latter sees the ‘control’ of terms, subjects and objects, to be in the terms and objects themselves, as objects in themselves. Hence we have (again, inevitably, perpetually), in consideration of the SRs, a dual divergence; Graham Harman who steps into the object (objects is all there is) finds a reality that though logically consistent is nevertheless somewhat difficult if not contrary to any common human sense, which is of course what he would find (what is an object divorced from a subject? What is a subject if it is only an object?). Yet he asserts such true object as actually and really true, as if he is privy to a more true reality that everyone should now understand (the ‘thought police’ assertion). Then we have aphilosophy, which upon reflection might be better termed as “philosophy-A”, as there is supposedly already a ‘philosophy-X’ which seems (maybe) already still conventional. Here discourse is all there is and because of this all terms, their meanings and or definitions, are objects. This latter does not privilege the subject, nor attempts to arrive at the object by denying the historical formulation of the subject, but instead speaks of effects of consciousness. On one hand, the effect of consciousness comfortably distanced from its own operations (in denial so it “Don’t Even Know I Am Lying”) so it can operate effectively with the tool of logic develops conventional reality in general as a primary base upon which the subsequent base may take form in the fantastical extreme of ‘logically real’ nonsense, for which we can probably begin see the evidence of faith at work (Speculative Realism, and Object Ontology). On the other hand, the effect of consciousness that compromises the distance consciousness would impose for itself in reality arrives with the meaning of contradiction as meaning (irony, and — wink, wink — philosophy-A). But nevertheless such Objects must necessarily exist given the conventional allowance for plausibility in negotiation coupled with the capitalized identity. One can only wonder if the people in Liberia who raided an Ebola treatment center based upon their belief that no such disease exists, that it is a Western capitalistic conspiracy, needed some thought police.
Yet I leave such real conventional possibilities to their proper domain; the ontological description of objects that are not merely terms, real objects, grants a description of the interrelating of terms as an objective field. Yet this field comes about in the holding out from the subject, because it will collapse in the subject.
I thereby suggest the divergence that has a more substantial propositional base, even if, indeed, such a proposition is admittedly not real. For what is collapsing is in the tension that develops by the holding apart that which is natively indigenous. When there is no tension, then the subject may be breached as to how the object manifests reality. Hence, the dual nature of the divergence of which we speak.
I agree with Graham Harman’s assessment of the Kantian failure, that Western philosophy is caught and spends its time now reiterating the same arguments, the faults and merits of ideas that stem from a human subject center attempting to mitigate an apparent gap between the cogito and the object. Divergence thus takes two forms. We argue that Harman and Miellasosux and the ‘speculative’ sort lack in their approach, i.e. they are found in what we see is the hard correlationalist limit, and it is this limit that justifies their route into the object through the conventional Sartean existential revolt (from the limit back into the limit), the (Kantian) subject and its route having been played out is now retreading its own ground through different terms, so invested in the state of reality conventional philosophy is, and they are in effect missing — or perhaps not missing it; this is the significance of the pocket veto — the fault of the object-term identity which is the Kantian thesis; which is to say, they flat out do not recognize it, in denial through plain ignorance or in denial in the face of the contradiction.
This situation unfolds in the following manner: They are either relying fully upon the true object of faith, and if so are at once accepting their (Kantian) intuitive faculty as a common faculty of human consciousness, and so read Kant’s ideas as a true (historical) object to be discerned and built upon in the progress of human knowledge, thereby missing the significant feature of at least “The Critique of Pure Reason”; or, they are being deceptive in that the intuition they have had is a particularly significant inspiration such that the degree of such inspiration would impose an offense upon the audience in which they engage, that is, the philosophical audience, by suggesting a privilege that is not available to everyone but which nevertheless they have due to the very intuition that is common among real humans, but ‘specialized’ in them. But the discourse of the Significant Event offers that to suggest that they are merely very educated or intelligent or have an otherwise unique view but without the intuited transcendental operation is to flat out deny the very aspect of their being human as being human; that is, unless they were indeed inspired by a transcendental and undisclosed aspect or influence. The progress that they thereby propose as a ‘new’ route upon the given discourse suggests that humanity might move out of a particular paradigm of thought, but not move out from being human, and thereby tells and reifies the conventional route: that discourse defines what and how human beings are as real human beings, and this is to say that somehow human beings are being not only influenced but indeed controlled by a power for which humans have no control except that they use discourse, and further this is to propose the greatest offense: such ‘special’ philosophers are especially privy to coming upon ‘inspired ideas’ (that are — nod, nod, wink, wink– not ‘transcendentally inspired’) that somehow allow them to gain purchase upon the center of power of discourse. This assertion through denial is exactly the Kantian proposal: that we can intuit an object’s truth due to the very nature of human consciousness being limited in its functioning. But the Speculative Realists deny this is true.
The problem of divergence remains as I have indicated; Harman and Miellassoux are still dealing with reality in reality. By my own definition, they are working along the conventional route, so we have then to distinguish what divergence means, and this is the work we have before us concerning the Significant Event. Obviously, The Speculative Realists’ divergence is from the type of philosophy just mentioned above. They diverge from ‘subject oriented’ to ‘object oriented’; this is plain. Yet the significance of their speculative divergence misses what should be seen as the true statement of Kant, to wit, there is no knowable object in-itself that can be gained outside of intuition and that to have achieved a ‘non-intuitive’ position one must be presented in a categorical imperative that then situates the ‘practical reason’ in a manner that is able to distinguish the two in a ‘non-practical’ way. In contrast, the overdetermined and common (mis-)interpretation of Kant allows for Kant’s real meaning that has been appropriated by Harman. Thus, to repeat, in so much as Harman, at least, concerns himself with the Object now, in the same way as described of Miellassoux in the previous segment, his (Harman) presentation seems to be and or otherwise must also be relying upon an undisclosed aspect (the state of categorical imperative that behaves so as to allow practical reason as a categorical precipitate, a hypothetical imperative) that informs his ability to offer a discussion about real-true objects, and so therefore can have no veracity so far as truth beyond what is real (realism), as he admits. But he denies Kant, and so either must derive the categorical and hypothetical reasons as further objects already true, that is, the facticity of their being a part of the philosophical series opens them to their possibility of being false, which is how he seems to see it; or, he is relying upon that very situation that Kant describes, and so is being dishonest. So we have argued that reality relies upon — reality is a function of consciousness, a thing, for the argument is of effects and not so much about describing what an ‘actual’ real object is; that is Harman’s job (or maybe all of conventional philosophy) — a distancing of consciousness from the object of its real involvement or consideration of reality. Harman denies the ‘subject’ philosophical rhetoric and uses another true object by which to gain his stature to be able to say that such subject-oriented ideas are done with; that is, he relies upon the truth of the series of discourse (the true object located of historical argument) to come to his divergence. If I have not been clear, this is saying that his first proposal is that only objects (an object oriented ontology) contain or reflect truth, and so he grants an unimpeachable premise that the historical series is true, by which to make his statement about objects, a statement that denies that the ability to know true objects can only be intuited. This is redundancy in its finest and the mark of the repetition of real argument; this is discursive slight of hand and is indicative of how Slavoj Zizek involves the 5 stages of grief (see a later segment). Thus, the discourse of the Significant Event suggests that Harman (and M) has enacted a ‘pocket veto’ that places the transcendent clause ‘in his pocket’, such that it is already ‘had’, and by this is able to venture out into the world an ‘inspired agent’ of transcendence, motivated by a unspoken of aspect that in other days and discourses would be called ‘God’.
Oh shit. I didn’t just say that. Wait wait wait — aren’t we attempting to remove the transcendent?
Harman’s only saving grace is then by the real divergent move. Two objects touch vicariously and in sincerity. He has thereby re-instated the identity of the basic duality in essential reality, a reality that includes the individual vicariously, that is to say, reality includes the individual in place of the human being; he closes the gap by exchanging real identical categorical imperatives. This is ironic: Harman is arguing a removal of the subject by placing it in the position of the object sincerely, truly, and thus is he able to describe the True Object of the Subject; that is, nothing that is attainable through real tangible sensibility, except real contingency (as an Object), which is a system that defines itself in such a way so as to exclude that which is ‘accidental’. This appears to be the weight of his whole argument (though the jury is still out). Hence, by contrast, what is attainable is to describe the subject of the object, and this (sorry to keep dangling the carrot) is to introduce the significant event.
The odd thing is that hardly anyone will be able to see themselves beyond the terms by which they identify themselves in reality and so they will miss their own veto — if they ever had one — and and the description of the significant event will likely be just as nonsensical, but even more so. Yet if you are ready for more then the fish might not have broken the line.
End Part 8.
* * *
It would be cool if a few people would comment.
Really End part 8.
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