The Matter at Hand, part 3: A Funny History Needs Its Justification in Theory.

Satire. One always should keep a good humor in one’s pocket for those times when something hits a little too close to home. It seems a little too obvious why such American shows such as “The Daily Show” and “The Cobert Report” Arose when they did: With the generation after the post-moderns, after the hippie eternal happiness, after the disco bliss and the punk rock sarcasm, what was left to do? We repeatedly come across the strange social childish reaction that has to do with being different than the parents, topping or rather absorbing and retreating the same situation that is being human in the contradicting urban world by enacting attitudes and fashion opposite to the previous generation. Or at least we like to think (as children) that we are being ‘different’ or enacting our individuality. Then the so called adults love to go on a about the similarities of when they were kids, and differences. The new and the old. But it does seem that the new generation is always trying to be the different that is now the new different. The problem is they never quite achieve the new newness; it’s always a rehashing of the old, and because young people tend to have such a myopic view of the world and then as young adults behave and act and even force this ‘new view’ out upon the world to have everyone then believe it is that way, that this new is indeed cooler and more hip than the last new new, that this new is thus better.

Might we take a moment and offer a funny picture of the last 150- so years. Factories and farms. Young people go to the cities and find the harsh situation of small freedom, a new struggling freedom condensed from stretches of slow landscape, to boxes of fast frustration. They get pissed and want to assert themselves and so, as children do, pick fights. World War One and Two. In all this industrial technological speed, sex becomes likewise more intensely viewed. Men get the business suit, women get the bikini. So some dude is looking for a chemical to promote weight loss. He finds LSD and goes rides a bike around town. The urban testosterone Wars end and there’s a bunch of kids with nothing to do now that industrial freedom has allowed for the suburban image of large freedom again. The adult kids of the Wars now feel good with their new buddies, who in their winning group have established a type of secure utopia, the good fight has yielded the good life. They have kids and these kids become rapidly bored since the utopia of the Wars have brought the Beaver Cleaver serenity. But these new generation kids have to be discontent. They they find drugs. Jazz and Rock, Roll, the Beats and the Hippies; their frustration is not in confinement but the opposite. They are all high in their new large conceptual landscape. They assert their war against what seems to them in their childish myopia to be the aggravating problem: The limitations put upon humanity by systemic norms. But there is no norms; the ‘norms’ are really just that the stressed out city life pressed up against itself for some room, and got it. Now the children don’t appreciate this roomy environment of contentment; this roomy environment is actually conceptually confined because there isn’t really room for everyone, but only the bullies who won the World fight.

Post-Modernism. What was modern was merely one or two generation’s idea’s put into practice, of humans dealing with industrial technology. Post-Modern is thus a further War on the Peace that the previous War achieved. Humanity takes on a dynamic never seen before. Being comfortable is not allowed to be comfortable. The ends have to be rerouted to the means; we cannot stay in ends because we’re really pissed off about our lack of freedom, which is really a traditional type of childishness reinstated as a real determinator of what is allowed to be real. We cannot rest in a peaceful adulthood because we have to justify our situation to the kids, who perpetually demand a newness in the face of freedom, such that what is freedom and happiness cannot be so because of the industrial deferment to the childish view. This is capitalism: The move to the city allowed for an intensity of competition that needed be justified against the degree of frustration required to negotiate the factory life style (production as real imperative). The route of justification is passed down to the child because it is the childish attitude that needs be upheld if the peace of the new is to be justified for its effort.

So the hippies had an experience. This experience is revolution. But the revolution never came to pass in the world, but always had to be foreshortened and qualified against the real standard already in place. It seemed that the standard was the problem that could never be removed. Disco then dealt with it by avoiding the question and doing lots of cocaine. The more intense, sincere and honest portion of the children saw that the revolution failed in the face of reaction. Punk, or urban rock and roll, dealt with it by being pissed off and sarcastic, getting drunk and belligerent and dying in heroin sulk. But neither did peace, avoidance nor anger rid the problem; so those who were not so concerned with things in general as freedom, instead focused their efforts in how to be happy given the urban condition. They found it in money. By neatly avoiding the community effort towards freedom, which leads to war (a true community of self righteous children fight) they instead concentrated their efforts for themselves (why not be just self righteous without the implication of community). Cocaine became crack, and crack reflected money.

So this situation needed to have a new against it. Whoever got the most toys may have won, but what was left was a whole population who were not getting very many toys. We needed a route whereby the most possible children got to at least have a shot at getting the toys they want. The avoidance and sarcasm allowed for small group of insensitive psychopathic people to get one over on everyone else. We needed a new route to be new against the previous attitudes of justification: satire. The traditional justification of childish want for the new has gotten us to where we do not take our seriousness seriously. This is the middle route. This is the route of moderation. As long as we justify our childishness by not taking so seriously that we indeed have no control over our attitude then we can have our toys and be happy in freedom because we are attempting to allow everyone to have toys. As Barak Obama said, we have to make it to everyone who wants it and is willing to work had and make the effort can have an equal shot at getting it (the American Dream).

But this sincere satire will be trumped also, because it still is a childish justification. Perhaps it is a type of last resort of justification of that which can only be justified, but it is that justification is based in a denial of what is truly occurring. What is truly occurring is the process of coming to terms with the reality that there is no freedom but in justification, that we are determined by objects, and that such justification is inherently a local function, a function of social locality of the individual and that the extrapolation of such justification outside or beyond the ambiguous locality yields the ethical contradictions that Zizek notices.

What we have then in the discussion of the philosophical revolution, the move of rejection of Object Ontology and the new realists, has to do with not some reconciliation of the Real, as the post-post-moderns (Badiou, Laruelle, Zizek) would have it, where ideology and the individual obtain a sort of truce and combine in some effective agency, but more in the divergence that the Significant Event recalls. That ideology is a particular enforcement of reality, but that what is true is even more strange than what Graham Harman would have (but I would have to read more of his to qualify this opinion). And that history is the process of coming to terms with this truth; reality the vehicle for this process…

…but that this, in the end, is never comprehended, because its conveyance of meaning is always usurped in the conventional rhetoric of Faith.

No wonder we need satire.


Ok; next part 4 we will get to the relation between the PMG and Zizek.

The Matter At Hand, Part 2: The Mark of Faith — Object Oriented Philosophy, the ‘New’ Realisms and Post-Modernism.

“What happened ??”


In the event of reading an essay generated by the PMG, we have to think from the perspective of not knowing that it is a fake, keeping in mind that this program is admittedly old and stunted in its potential, but that it would be possible to write a more complex protocol that could generate more lengthy and involved syntactical and contextual structures that would ultimately be very difficult to discern as bogus. Under this presumption that we are indeed reading a piece of legitimate theory, we need only to understand the turn in thought that occurs upon being let into the joke, so to speak, and what that says not only of being human, but more, of thought itself, as well then what history is and means. This is because in this type of upsetting, the ground for our theoretical efforts is not so easily found, for often enough the ground itself is in question by the mode of offering of the theory.

Indeed, from this setting is elicited a mounting frustration resolved not by confronting the situation — the subsequent post-modern thought thought itself to confronting it — but by completely rejecting the whole of the line of thought that brought about the situation in first place (Object Oriented Philosophy, Speculative and the ‘new’ Realisms) loosely defined against history as Cartesian, Copernican or Kantian, and for our present situation as ‘phenominalist’ and its corresponding conventional paradox noticed by Quentin Miessalloux as correlationalism. The problem here in these latest proposals is that they cannot get beyond the problem so they reject it by sublating the problem as the impetus and catalyst by which such ‘new Realist’ positions may arise. In other words, they assert that the method must be applied in moderation and from there we might then be able to find a True basis, a ground, for real discourse. Moderation and mediation is thus the mode where reality is true — but hasn’t this been the maxim of all real conventionality, an assertion of revolutionary action based in a return to the norm, a reactionary move?? Are they really saying that The True Reality should be found through moderation ?? I want to say ‘yes’, but in response to what (really) does this ‘yes’ arise (can we be really honest) ? (Come on; are we allowed to be honest yet ? Well, maybe not yet. ) If indeed the answer is yes, then it is not too difficult a stretch to see the reinstatement of a metaphysical imperative, which is to say, for other terms, a manifest destiny, a providence that has encompassed the whole of humanity throughout history as it continues to do so at this very moment — but set aside in argument, the question of ‘God’ or ‘spirit’ being left now to the opinion of religion, the conventional reality of the pure multiple.

Note that it is absolutely ironic and consistent with the unbiased argument that the question of the philosophical revolution occurs and is answered in the setting aside of the question itself. This is the Speculative move. But the issue left is how and why this move came about, as well as how it continues to be a problem, because until then, we can only hope — but again, what is conventional faith ? This is then how we get to the significant philosophical issue, and the continuance of the status quo methodology is how we get to the necessity of revealing just what is entailed in the conventional reaction (denial).


These two sites (really, the one just links to the other) can serve as an example of how we react:


Consciousness is a funny thing; making meaning is all it does. No matter what one wants to make of it, the very making is meaning made. The question is always whether this meaning has any essential teleology; the stringing along or construing of meaning is the issue here. The conflation or association the site above has made between the PMG and the discourses if Slavoj Zizek is significant. Just as Alan Sokal helped to deflate the Post Modern bubble (a bubble, I might say, created by many accredited people who had no clue), the process of revealing how consciousness works, as opposed to merely riding upon reactionary theoretical tropes in the attempt to assert a more real reality and thereby create an identity, must evoke uncomfortable meanings, confronting and even breaching the fashionable trend of the day.

For what we are dealing with here is the maxim of operational consciousness: In the effort for the True Object (which is really itself) the individual takes True Objects as essentially separate universal entities as problematic items for the purpose of asserting the Truth of such entities to establish itself, the individual. This maxim is responsible for reality, as this phenomenon enacts a strange force that is the power of itself; the power of reality is that it allows for and or creates an arena in which real elements may interact in a real way. This is so true that it hardly need be stated, and when it is stated people roll their eyes because it sounds so ridiculous. Yet if it isn’t stated then people do not roll their eyes and can continue in plausible denial; it is after it is stated that real progress may occur, for until that point, it was only as an illusion of progress, as reality is never an illusion. For we are really dealing with me and you, and the object that allows for real determination of this distinction.

As to the blogger that came up with ‘Zizuku’ (so great!): In reality, therefore, an intelligent person may read Zizek and see a pattern to his rhetoric. Just as the PMG’s products are discounted against actual human agency, Zizek’s mode is discounted as a ridiculous game, but both which are seen to be included for ‘good’ human production of theory given that the limitations of their modes are identified, made into a real-true object, and now can be moved upon to actually yield ‘better’ theoretical productions. As I have said, the issue concerns how we distinguish between an essay that is basically a random assemblage of syntax that appears to make sense, and an actual researched and thought out humanly constructed meaningful assemblage of contextual significance? How do we reconcile ‘random’ through an ‘ordering’ of method, since the essays are generated along a specific path of commands (a program), using a specific pool of terms that are assembled based upon no apparent consideration of the various individual terms’ meanings? And as to Zizek in this regard; what does it mean that Zizek’s discursive performances can be discerned to a scheme (Zizuku)? How are these presentations related, what is being apprehended and comprehended, and how is this assessment a reaction?


First, the PMG. So to back up a little bit, the point here is the ‘better’ productions. The problem the PMG revealed was that where discourse was at issue, deconstruction, the questioning of discursive authority, and hermeneutical analysis being operative, the post-modern ideal itself was taken in a mistaken mode, as indication of a further True Object that might be gained through such methods. The fact of the ability to program such a generator, nevermind Sokal’s ability to write a fake paper that was taken as legitimate post-modern theory, shows that the ‘program’ of human meaning itself taken as a route by which to construct and or reveal more meaning yields nonsense, but that the result of the nonsense, taken as a further product of its own method for meaning, yields the sense that such ‘low level’ meaning making is nonsense: This is thus the sense that comes from nonsense that makes the nonsense sensible. By a reduction of discourse to its own operational bases as a means to analyze its productions (deconstruction; hermeneutics) against the result of this process as an analysis, we get at a real outline of the situation handed to us: A real nonsensical meaning is essentially a baseline from which all other meaningful discourses may arise; this is what we can justifiably call ‘void’. Then the production of meaning that notices the nonsensical result: The real event that begins the count of the pure multiple. Hence, the PMG is the instrumental manifestation of the baseline for making meaning, and thus while it does show that the meaning we make might just as well be just as nonsensical, that we are also merely ordering machines without a basis where we can find the ‘order of the order’, the more significant meaning we get from this temporal marking of the parameters of knowledge is out of a type of Sartean revolt: We revolt from this abyss of free syntax back into the contextual limit. But more; once we fall back into the imperative for context, we see the contextual world as deriving from a necessary order that gives significantly meaningful order, or, orderly meaning: purpose, teleology. This is not a critique of the situation, as post-modern ideals would usually advocate (Zizek: the example somehow undermines the veracity of itself), but merely a stating of the fact of the matter.

In other words, the ideal that discourse is all there is yields (or has yielded) a Kantian intuited world where the products of the PM method arose due to the True Object that is the discourse and method, such that this True base thus necessarily yields a better more real Truth of the universe: This is the mark of conventional faith. The PM discourse itself as an arena arisen from the efforts of individuals attempting to establish their identity in a true reality ironically yielded a theoretical reality that came to be called out for its nonsensical rhetoric. The discursive arena itself supported a Truth that functioned to further a real theoretical validity. But this validity was soon revealed to be just that: theoretical but basically nonsense. Structurally sound and justified within a particular discursive cohortive arena by the fact of its placement within institutions of ‘higher learning’ (pun absolutely intended).

Thus our question that comes to bare on the situation: What grounds theory? The answer is ironic, but the irony is missed in most cases, typically, as evidenced by the past 200+/- years of philosophy. I need not rehash the essays of Constructive Undoing, but enough to say that language is supposed material of its own objective analysis, the object that is language as well as the object of its clausal reference, of its intent meaning; the irony being of a particularly Kantian problematic (extrapolated conventionally in the 200 year span) in so much as every object of this discursive case is taken to be or have been intuitively apprehended, which is to say, from the assumed transcendent affection. In this case, it is of no matter what ones logic or personal belief is because there is no theory that does not operate within knowledge and discourse.

So the question comes to be pivotal to how philosophical effort should proceed, and it is in response to this problem that Realist philosophies such a s Harman’s OOO arise; though i would hesitate to lump this ‘new’ effort into a common theme, the effort does arise in a common thread to the Significant Event as well to reflect upon the issue of this essay here, which is how consciousness functions when confronted with its own limit, and what that likewise means in (the production of) reality.


Thus next up in part 3: What is the relationship between the products of the PMG and the rhetoric of Zizek?

The Matter At Hand, Part 1: Post-Modernism, Artificial Intelligence, the Conventional Limit, and Object Oriented Ontology.

From reading an essay a few days ago, I was reminded of The Postmodern Generator. You can go read a good essay at:

Now when I say ‘good’ I mean it can make sense. If you have never heard of it, or didn’t read the very end of the page, the PM Generator is a program that generates essays. Click the link again and it will produce another one. They are completely false.

I was reminded of the PMG after reading a ‘actually legitimate’ essay that made a certain amount of sense but that I really could gain no baring upon what it was addressing or really saying. Of course, though, we must acknowledge that there are types of privileged discourse that have to do with production niches. Computer code may appear like nonsense to the layman, but the meaning of the code is easily identified to its object, whether it be origination, such as the direct meaning of commands and their ordering to the machine, or their destination, the effect or running operation of the code’s incorporation as an application. The ground and purpose of the code, though confusing to the layman, can be easily explained. Yet, in philosophy and theoretical discourse, we have a different situation. If I had gone into the essay (the ‘legitimate’ one I read) with a sense that it must have relevance and be based in a certain potential for truth, then I might have read it more than twice and made a good effort to find out what it meant, including following references to other essays that might be in its genre, and concluded that it had something significant to offer. But I didn’t. I saw — for sure after the second read — that, for one, it was purely privileged in its bearings, but privileged in a different way than computer programming; which is to say, the meaning and point it addresses is proposed and suspended in a cohortive discursive base that is taken as relevant merely because there are people in positions of authority and or respect who are speaking in such a way. But then also, for two, that not only was it probably important merely because certain people have developed an investment arena for meaning, but more so, the arena was merely that: The arena allowed for a fabrication (without grounding) to appear as if it had significance in deep human roots, socially ideological and or political, of a kind of substantial innately human kind and pertinence, and due to this fabrication of meaning caused a series of human efforts of various vectors (political, economical, ideological, artistic) to be based in the arena solely for the purpose of inflating the identity capital of the people involved in the fabrication of the arena. But it it is just this kind of insubstantial rhetoric that post-modernism allows to be true, for it makes itself true by it being a product of human sensibility, but of an insensible sensibility that is the egocentric transcendent that has gotten us exactly to the place of reasoning that sees world destructing activities, such as global warming or climate change, democratic-capitalistic support of aristocratic development, two-faced power structures that advocate equal access while being allowed for through an inherent subordination and oppression of designated marginalized segments of society, ideological disclaimers for ‘naturalized’ inequality and oppression, etcetera.

The point, I suppose, I am trying to make is that it is not that the PMG is writing nonsensical pieces of theory. The defenders of the significance of ‘real’ theory is the disclaimer that …” The Postmodernism Generator was written by Andrew C. Bulhak using the Dada Engine, a system for generating random text from recursive grammars, and modified very slightly by Josh Larios (this version, anyway. There are others out there).” They point at the ‘random’ and ‘recursive’ elements of the generation and exclude what other theory may be made by humans. And, this is not to say that human generated theory itself is also random and nonsensical at root. Maybe this is so, but then we have only enacted an eternal irony for which the argument is but a point of contention (perhaps a kind of ‘the’ point of contention whereby the individual is marked off to his her identity), and then one might be better suited to a religious monastery.

I am more concerned with how real theory is distinguished from PMG theory, because, for one, if we are indeed moving to the inception of a true artificial intelligence, we need encounter and identify the limits of human conscious effort and not only how human consciousness may operate as a real item, but also how this real item functions as a item of what is true of the universe in which reality is formed. We need encounter that aspect of being human that gains reality by its offense, that is, in the effort to create identity against the bare fact of its existence. We may have realized what it means to exist, but we have have not encountered how we react to such a sentence; we have only reacted to the truth, we have yet to reveal what occurs when such a moment of truth is come upon. If we allow ourselves as human beings to be able so easily fall prey to discursive ploys of fabricated meaning, should we not realize that an artificial intelligence will be able to notice this human tendency, this weak spot, and take advantage of the flaw in the fabric that is and has been causing our essential lack in potential? Should we think any less that an artificial intelligence of our own making will be an intelligence nonetheless not human intelligence ? The question must be: Can we program our lack as an inherent limit of artificial intelligence? Are we able to do this, or is the fact of the possibility of a true AI a harbinger an indication that our lack is indeed a lack of being human and not of our creations’ ? This is the issue of the point of contention: What is contingency and cause?

Because this is to say that the flaw is exactly the reassertion of essential Will that gains its force through meaning based in a universal maxim of segregation and the exploitation of blind spots inherent to such segregation, that this is a human mode, and that if a human as itself may see this flaw — shall we be so arrogant as to presume an intelligence of our making will necessarily be a human intelligence ? Indeed, would not an ‘artificial’ intelligence have at least an equal probability to have capacities that arise in the blind spot of human intelligence in so much as the likes of Graham Harman shine light into the regions of the universe that have intelligence (being) regardless of what human beings regard as such? The Frankenstein’s monster of human creation is not that humans let it get away from human control, but that humanity itself was already beyond its own control. Is not this the evidence that what we would consider an artificial intelligence actually more likely to be an intelligence that offends us, our ability to be sensible? Such that a true artificial intelligence would then actually be an intelligence that overlaps what is being (Dasein) as our mode of corresponding intelligence with what is intelligence proper, as modes of being of an actually more true universal reality? ‘Artificial intelligence’ thus might be that intelligence that evidences to us how our transcendental mode is actually merely one type of mode of being, A.I. then the revealing of the limit that is the transcendental thought by its actually arising partially within the (non-ethical) universal paradigm, straddling, if you will, the willed and the non-willed. Would human intelligence as a conventional red herring be able to stand up to a mode of intelligence that understands itself as a determined mode of activity, that is to say, determined by objects ? Nietchze might say that it should be able to.

For what are we seeing with the PMG? And what is the reaction against?

Shall we see in Part 2 ?

…this is not true through some consideration of argument where Slavoj offered these statements; it is true because I can read it in no other way for the statement to mean what it means.


“I can only think of my ‘real’ sexuality as different from performed stereotypes. ..I can only think of my ‘nation’ or ‘community’ in relation to an other who is threatening that community” – slavoj zizek

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Reblog Zizek quote.

Indeed, Zizek here exemplifies the difference I try to highlight in an earlier essay, between description and argument. That the description is usually, conventionally, taken as argument, such that the very description not only presents an exclusive position but also thereby a proposal of what is incorrect of the situation.


“the way to over­come an idea is to exemplify it, but an example never simply exemplifies a notion; it usually tells you what is wrong with this notion, the very staging actualization of this attitude produces something more which undermines it.” – Slavoj Zizek on why he never stops giving new expamples from popular culture

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A Little Hegel.

Here’s another Reply Post. This one to the post again just prior to this one, “Thoughts About Hegel…”


It is interesting that Hegel seems to account for every contingency but the contingency that is contingent Lol.

What are or is these tensions?

Say we are talking about a person’s tensions, as in an individual person of themselves, a kind of discomfort that resides or occurs for a person. One could say that this tension – or as a general accounting for perhaps many tensions that a person may encounter – can be understood through a type of conceptual reference. Because, often or usually a person has some sort of ‘tension’ or problem that can be a sort of feeling, and then this feeling is sought for its reason or cause. How do we search for this cause? Through discourse, through terms, ideas associated with those terms.

It is not very difficult to find that the terms lead to a discrepancy of self, which is to say, discrepant concepts, and these are seen to indicate the reason for the unsettled position. For example, things are not as one would want them to be in the world, and so the person is unsettled, is in tension with the world. Often, spiritual and psychological ideals frame how such various tensions can be resolved, like, if a person has done something to offend someone then one may forgive them, or maybe talk or discuss with them the issue.

Philosophically, the tension arrives in how such situations arrive in the first place and how we may go about explaining the situation so as to enact a solution: The revealed situation reveals more tension.

Now, certain areas of philosophy see Christianity as a pinnacle of the philosophical situation. This is generally due to the situation set out here, of this seemingly essential tension that cannot be overcome. That is, there appears to be two ways to overcome the tension:

(1) Ignore it. This is the typical solution; it is, what one could call, the real solution, for it is the solution of moderation, of stepping into and through life as life is what it is and deal with it in the manner by which one deals with it. This is also the route of ignorance or naivety, but not in a derogatory, patronizing or otherwise negative sense, merely in a matter of fact sense; this can be called the unreflective route. Here, the meaning of terms is understood to convey or otherwise reflect what is true of reality; the terms themselves take up the reflection, and the individual finds reflection through the terms. This is the meaning of fetishism and the basis for the critique of capitalism. This is to say that it is such quality of terms that allow a person an ability for ‘objective’ reflection upon oneself. Thoughts do not wander to the consideration of themselves beyond reference to terms that identify what is really occurring. The subject-individual thus remains ‘moderate’, a medium of reality. The tension that thereby remains or is otherwise apparently operative may thereby be still referenced to causes other than the individual; the person can ‘blame’ things, situations as the cause of the tension. The truth of the real situation is ‘auto-referential’ to what is revealed of it: Reflection upon this type of situation as a whole reveals that there is still a tension, and the ’cause’ of this tension is thus an ‘eternal’ cause, a primary or basic cause, ‘First cause’, the reason of which is argued from this cause to the reason, or purpose, such that another referent can be called upon that is ‘beyond’ the tension, or that can relieve the tension. Christianity, in this way, may function within this real scheme as a type of short circuit, a means to relieve the tension by ignoring it through accentuating that real solution, Christ. In moderative or unreflective (conventional) reality, this may be a real possibility for solution. Similarly, the other Book religions (including modern psychology) offer the same solution in different guises; through moderative reality, one may find a solution to the tension by ignoring the tension through a carefully defined scheme of meaning whereby the basic real situation is explained to be, in essence, not so powerful; i.e. there is a power that is more powerful. The moderation is to counter the tension through a type of acceptance of the tension as part and parcel of reality. The tension is thereby ignored rather than actually overcome, because what has occurred is the return of the thought to its ‘rightful’ place of moderation, which is to say, “…all things in moderation“. In this light, it is a good phrasing to say that perhaps Christ amounts to a ‘relaxing’ of tension.

(2) Confront it. This confrontation is the philosophical move; the culmination or end run of the philosophical move is ‘revolution’, which is found not so much through the ‘ignorance’ of moderation, but in the ‘knowledge’ of the extreme. Here, one does not find Christ as an exceptional item, as that effective dike of causal effluence; rather, Christ is seen more in its Gnostic sense, that state of knowledge whereby reality is not ignored but fully acknowledged and dealt with as it is integral and innate to the individual. This situation is reflective, because it gains its view due to a ‘previously unaccounted for’ reflection, a reflection that is not found through the subject investment in the true term, that is, the potential for the term to convey or otherwise represent the truth of the situation, what we call the True Object. This situation, as Alain Badiou might call it, is the reflection of the ‘some-other’, and is the foundation and instigation of the dialectic of the revolutionary subject.

What occurs with this revolution is a reorganization of what reality is. The duality, the tension thereof, between object and subject, world and person, is not the same as it once was: But it is not that tension has been removed, but the position from which tension, as a meaning, takes place has been resituated. The tension no longer occurs due to a fundamental distinction between an essential subject-person and an essential object-thing, as the tension of an inner-subject may be referenced against a real object by which to explain why the tension may be occurring. Now, the tension is understood to be an essential feature of the subject because objects are not dismissed from the subject occurring as a subject. Objects do not then cause the tension, but are indeed the object of tension, the object (-ive) of the subject in the occasioning of the Event. But not merely events that arise as various objects confront the subject; more: The Significant (revolutionary) Event by which the subject is able to have objects in the first place: As a world.

It is thisworld that is dealt with by non-conventional philosophy, or what should be called just philosophy. The efforts of philosophical effort tend to discuss ideology and politics because to speak of the ‘spirit’ appears necessarily to fall back into the essential segregated subject. And hence we have the tension that began the whole episode; the subject in a negotiation of objects, that falls pray to the power of the object, which develops into the discourse of ideology and politics.

Hegel, to my ears, is saying that this repetitive situation cannot have anything to do with some essential free subjective agency, since the discussion which takes such free agency as the basis by which a progressive discussion takes place, must occur from the position of moderation, or, as a ‘mediated’ situation, which then denies the validity of the effort that has occurred philosophically. And this is to say, where the philosophical effort attempts to reduce real occurrence of world to an explainable event, in effect, taking the extreme move (thesis; as one manner of meaning) toward an easing of tension (anti-thesis), ignores the fact of the moderate position that is occurring in the very act of the extreme, and hence the very subject of free agency must be determined by an aspect against which moderation (mediation) can take place, against which an individual finds prudence in moderation, and thus by providence.


The ‘watering down’ that Hegel appears to do, concerns a reinstatement of essential duality. It is indeed a real occurrence where someone might come across some ‘unitive’ feeling or understanding of reality, where tensions might be relaxed in order to address the contingencies of the everyday: Instead of reifying differences, one may find the commonalities, or accept differences in order to find a more comfortable and happy situation for oneself and indeed all parties. Jesus can be understood through a variety of lenses, and all these lenses are real and can be used to justify the essential subject through transcendental meaning.

I might suggest, though, that what Hegel is saying is not so much an argument by which he has come to terms with reality and thus wishes to explain to others how they might also come to terms. This is a workable feature of the issue at hand, what I call the point of contention. Rather, Hegel also can be seen from a less ‘tense’ angle: Hegel is expressing no tension, and by this revolutionary state of being (what Hiedegger will call Dasein), because he is not offended at what reality presents to the subject at all times, he is able to describe the situation as a situation of tension. He is involved in description, and not so much making a proposal or argument of how it might be.

Hence, the tension Hegel is viewed to express is itself located in the meaning that is not ‘in the spirit’ of what he is saying, but that this ‘spirit’ resides in his meaning as his meaning thus contradicts his meaning because he has explained all the facets of how reality may have any meaning at all.

All this, in my book, is ironic. And thus the significant discussion should occur as a description of what occurs, rather than a discussion of what might be an essential meaning of a ‘more real’ reality, as this latter discussion is well versed and occurs everywhere and at all times in the conventional state.

The relaxing of tension might then occur ironically as the life is lived as only it can be, and as a description of this life as world holds no aspect too sacred or private, has no boundaries (at least for what may be discussed) against which to be offended.

Thoughts about Hegel’s dialectical process, and how some Christians feel that it waters down the Truth.

Interesting … Even if you are not a Christian.

Aquixotic Auriolerie

Can the Absolute Spirit be captured in a thesis? Or put into words? Does the Spirit assert itself?

Hegel seems to say that it can.

As well as I understand it, his idea is that through synthesizing opposing theses we will come to a greater, better synthesis. And the synthesis becomes a new thesis which negates a new antithesis; these eventually synthesize; and so forth.

There are some concerned Christians who think this process will dilute the purity of the Truth.

But, again, can Spirit can be made into a thesis? Is Christianity a thesis? Why then did Jesus teach in parables and with questions? And why did he say, “Agree with thine adversary quickly“? (Matt. 5:25). And also: “Resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.” (Matt. 5:39).

What would it look like for a person to…

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