Contiguity and 

The notion of correlational ism has seeds outside of that term. It is not just that Miellassoux Came up with that word and then it must stick by the argument that he used to talk about it, so far is facticity and ansestrality and things like that. The arc fossil

One does not even have to use his arguments or just to positioning of different knowledges to understand the same thing that he abbreviates by the term “correlational ism”. 

the situation that the speculative realists came upon is really the same thing that I came upon and then found that the speculative realists we’re already talking about it.

the point that I make about it is similar to the point that I make about physical things. But particular to the speculative realist kind of arguments that each of them tries to make, as well as despite them: there’s no amount of argument that is going to make someone who is existing in a Kantian paradigm, so to speak, move from that position; we use all sorts of terms to talk about this kind of centralized thinking paradigm that is neatly packaged into the word correlational ism. My point is that there is no argument that one can make that can bridge or traverse what I see as two basic and fundamental ways of coming upon the universe, what I say is an orientation upon objects.

This has nothing to do with whether or not there are physical objects and there are other kinds of objects. Because of course you could go to 10 different disciplines that use the word object and we would have 10 different usages for what it means by object, but also that in each of those instances various amounts of physicality an actual Ness of things would be accounted for in those various usages.

So to say the word “physical” as if I’m suddenly supposed to understand exactly what that means “as opposed to”, as though I can just define physical in a precise enough manner to where I understand exactly what you mean by physical, is kind of a moot point if I don’t understand originally what you’re talking about. If I don’t have a common basis between us, then you can use the word physical all you want and you and I can have a conversation, and you and I could still be talking about two different things..

This is why I say there is no traversal across a common category. In the end. Of course there is if we don’t think too much about it; perhaps that is why various philosophies say “all in moderation”, because it’s when we get to the extremes that we come to problems. That’s when people start taking up arms and want to get a kill each other because it is at the extremes that there is no moving across into the others area.

It might be that you are assuming everything can be understood in moderation, so to speak, maybe. You can tell me. 🙂

But I am definitely talking around the edges, definitely not in the moderated Norm Nor towards it.

No so far as counseling, it’s as if you just went back-and-forth between two positions in the past few posts of ours.

Because I told you, I think this whole line of discussion, kind of came out of that I said here I’m talking about counseling, and there I’m talking about philosophy, and yet it all comes under philosophy.

This is where contiguity comes into play.

Because similarly as the cement sidewalk that I’m walking upon cannot be reduced to molecules with mostly nothing and a human being that lives in a fantasy unless we employ a non-Sequitur somewhere in there, similarly does me as a person like any other person sit side-by-side in the field of knowledge which does not necessarily reduce to language or reduce to vocal cords or reduced to mind, or anything like that, again without upholding an inconsistency within perceived consistency– so me as a person like any other person sits side-by-side of the hard sidewalk, of the molecules was mostly nothing, of me counseling a person who is actually a physical person that has nothing to do with how I describe that person in their own physical actuality.

This other essay that I wrote that hopefully will be published. I think it’s a much better written essay and I think it goes right in line with what we’re going over right here. And I’m pretty well done with it and I’m going to submit it here in maybe today. So if you want I’ll send it over to you and when you have time maybe read it.

so I think me pointing out that when I’m talking about some thing philosophically I’m speaking dynamically, I’m speaking about situations that arise before I apply my phenomenological reductionism to say that “X” must be the case in the whole universe. Because what’s going on there are two different things. Two activities, dealing with two different actual situations that actually arise in the universe as such. And I call these various things that actually do arise “objects”.

On one hand, yes I could start reducing the consequences of objects within a linguistic frame. Or within the neurological frame. Or within an empirical frame to then say, maybe, that there are actual existing physical objects and then our imaginary objects. I’m sure these various frames could kind of melted into one another. But that’s what I’m kind of saying about philosophy how imprecise it is, because when we start talking about these vague notion’s for which we think that we can get very specific by just adding very specific definitions to, we start blurring lines without seeing it. I think the more we try to define our way into specific things that must be true of the whole universe, and work in an argument of reduction with another person say, the more we each fall back into our own phenomenological world and are not there able to see that we are crossing all sorts of lines without telling the other person that we’re doing so.

And I think we find this in the postmodern writers, I think Derrida kind of talks about this, and I feel like there’s a couple other authors that talk about how soon we have two subjects, two human beings, who are really just talking about their own worlds and never communicating. And I think that’s the point that Lyotard is making also. 

actually, Derrida Talks about these phenomenological worlds and communication through ‘differance’. but ultimately I’d say, he’s really only talking about one particular aspect of the world, which is the modern world. Hence the post modern title of these authors.

We have since moved “next to” that world. not beyond it.x
x