Contiguity 2

1,2,3. Does not imply that three negates or is otherwise the culmination of one and two, even as there may be a combination of one and two that can go into what is being three.

1, 2 and 3 arise contiguously, next to each other. Being in themselves. Just as I have three rocks before me in their physical incarnation. Each of the rocks is one. And the fact that I might group two together to say “this is two” One is not negated, nor does it disappear in the being this that is the rock in the set of two. But neither does the object which is the two things, perhaps made into a sort of artistic statue, become negated by there being this third object next to it.

1, 2, 3 In a different instance, where I might say that one equals and then write some discursive things, put some words together under or within 1. And then 2. And then 3. Such objects can arise and concord contiguously in the same way as the rocks described before. 

This is not to say that I cannot describe 12 and three in a multitude of different ways, reducing them to different situations ultimately what might be the case or what might not be the case, each with their various arguments. Rather, it is to show a different ontological condition. One which does not answer to the suggestion or causal imperative that three rocks must reduce to some underlying unity. 

This aspect of existence concerns cause. Basically, the question is whether or not we must insist that there is a basic fundamental and first cause to all things, or whether there may be fundamentally multiple instances of causes that do not reduce to a further unitive and ultimate one first cause.

But again, this is not reductive, to say that one of these two cases must actually be the case. This is not an issue about either this must be the case, or that must be the case. It is to pose that both indeed can be the case.

This is a radically different way of reckoning what we are dealing with when we talk about reality and the universe .
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