Does meaning mean anything? What is the meaning of meaning?
In what way or when can a computer know something?
We can start anywhere. We can start in an arbitrary middle and find the modern subject.
…and thats fine.
Or we can start with something specific that is immovable and not relative.
We can start by saying that a computer does not know anything;
and, what are we trying to accomplish when we argue that a computer can know something?
What we try to accomplish by saying that a computer does not know anything is to make a parallel ontological move instead of a causal or vectoral ontological move. A move that is upon or to something that is not itself, as different than a move that remains itself, only moving; a calculus rather than an arithmetic.
It is to say that the human being is able to exist as an ontologically equitable object with a computer. Which moves tells us which ‘knows’. Where is the center? Is the sun moving?
Is thought moving?
We can thus say that a human being does not know anything, but more precisely as analogous to what a computer actually does — it does do stuff — that the human beings’ knowledge is a result of operation.
A computer does not know what is programmed or coded. It cannot know or conceive of what or how coding occurs. It is entirely unable through any of its processes, no matter what is programmed or coded, to know or conceive of what or how the coding comes into being or even what the code might actually be; any knowledge of such coding is ultimately merely an operation and not actual knowledge of the coding. The computer only knows what it does, and at that, in as much as what or how it does anything is entirely outside of its ability to know.
The human being is able to do things which appear to other human beings as though it is knowing something outside of its operation. Even while the first human is not knowing anything at all.
At all times no illusions exist.
A single human being is likewise able to think it knows something of itself.
But it is possible that what that person knows is entirely false, that is, unknowable.
The actualization of knowing only what another person (or thing) allows to appear cannot be communicated along a vector of knowing which understands self-knowledge as a kind of knowledge which everyone has access to or that occurs in every human being. For, it is equally possible that self-knowledge is a kind of knowledge for which only the other allows.
In other words; there is two kinds of knowledge which do not communicate accross a common category.
Philosophy exhibits these two routes at the same time, parallel in nature.
The question of change is: what happens when the manner by which change is able to change itself is changed? If the manner by which one understands change is itself changed, can the person see this change ?
The operative question is thus:
can you see it?