Knowing and Philosophy: View

Does meaning mean anything? What is the meaning of meaning?

In what way or when can a computer know something?

We can start anywhere. We can start in an arbitrary middle and find the modern subject.

…and thats fine.

Or we can start with something specific that is immovable and not relative.

We can start by saying that a computer does not know anything;

and, what are we trying to accomplish when we argue that a computer can know something?

What we try to accomplish by saying that a computer does not know anything is to make a parallel ontological move instead of a causal or vectoral ontological move. A move that is upon or to something that is not itself, as different than a move that remains itself, only moving; a calculus rather than an arithmetic.

It is to say that the human being is able to exist as an ontologically equitable object with a computer. Which moves tells us which ‘knows’. Where is the center? Is the sun moving?

Is thought moving?

We can thus say that a human being does not know anything, but more precisely as analogous to what a computer actually does — it does do stuff — that the human beings’ knowledge is a result of operation.

A computer does not know what is programmed or coded. It cannot know or conceive of what or how coding occurs. It is entirely unable through any of its processes, no matter what is programmed or coded, to know or conceive of what or how the coding comes into being or even what the code might actually be; any knowledge of such coding is ultimately merely an operation and not actual knowledge of the coding. The computer only knows what it does, and at that, in as much as what or how it does anything is entirely outside of its ability to know.

The human being is able to do things which appear to other human beings as though it is knowing something outside of its operation. Even while the first human is not knowing anything at all.

At all times no illusions exist.

A single human being is likewise able to think it knows something of itself.

But it is possible that what that person knows is entirely false, that is, unknowable.

The actualization of knowing only what another person (or thing) allows to appear cannot be communicated along a vector of knowing which understands self-knowledge as a kind of knowledge which everyone has access to or that occurs in every human being. For, it is equally possible that self-knowledge is a kind of knowledge for which only the other allows.

In other words; there is two kinds of knowledge which do not communicate accross a common category.

Philosophy exhibits these two routes at the same time, parallel in nature.

The question of change is: what happens when the manner by which change is able to change itself is changed? If the manner by which one understands change is itself changed, can the person see this change ?

The operative question is thus:

can you see it?

Author: landzek

My name is Lance Kair, a philosopher, a counselor and a musician who is being questioned.

33 thoughts on “Knowing and Philosophy: View”

  1. ….see. This is what I’m taking about : Through my interactions with you, you help me refine my ideas. You help me find the words to talk about what I’m really trying to say.

  2. Actually. In pondering more your comment, I think I am
    More speaking to a structuring of perception, than I am about metaphysics. If I can use that term ‘perception’. Becuase I am not addressing metaphysics; that I why I am able to locate and find the limitation that is D and Gs proposal (generally speaking): Becuase I’m not arguing about what constitutes a knowable “biggest picture”. Rather; I am discussing how the picture appears.

  3. It is complicated. That’s what Deleuze meant by naming his book “Logic of sense”, as u say it, the meaning of meaning.
    In fact we can’t perceive change but we can perceived something changed. So it all has to do with perception. Perception, representation and interpretation alongside language are the criteria of a meaning.
    A computer can’t perceive. But we have in common what you call programming or coding. We receive an education (or a representation) through parents and society.
    Yes it is a complicated subject

    1. Dude. In the WP app , I can’t tell what I read and what I have not in the comments. 😑So sorry if I’m late at replying to some of yours.

    2. The ‘we’ is problematic. Personally, that’s why I think D and G fell short: The assumption of we.

      Where do you “we“ fall into their general category?

      I can agree with most Of what they’re talking about and I feel I understand the various phenomena that they’re talking about, but I think that they over reach the capacity of Philosophy. and they are indicating a certain project, a certain project called “human”, at least in their time, that proposes itself as a sort of ubiquitous and omnipresent category into which all of us fall at all times and everywhere.

      The question that I ask and I like that Zizek poses, is: would I be able to communicate to someone if there was a different way to perceive change?

      What D and G generally assume is that there is some sort of human constant, some sort of overgeneralization that occurs somewhere in being that will stretch across a common category such that we all must fall into this category, if we understand it.

      I think that in understanding that category necessarily places me outside of what they’re talking about, rather than being a subject of it. The force of the imperative that is created by the category they generate in their philosophy limits what they are talking about as something that has already occurred , but in a way that it keeps occurring, hence “repetition”.

      But it is in the noticing of this repetition that place has us outside of what they’re talking about, not subject to what they consider subjectivity, machine, capitalism etc..

      It may describe something I am able to do, but it doesn’t necessarily describe what I am, and nor what I am able to do.

      Hence the question is if I am perceiving change differently than the supposed constant, what does it say of, for example, DNG‘s philosophy of desire, say? Would I be able to communicate to someone else this different paradigm of change?

      This is what I mean by “can you see it?”

      It is not a subjective limitation. It is due to the limitation that it can no longer be called “of the subject”.

      If indeed there was a human being that was not existing within or in tubes by this “schizophrenic capitalism”, say, would all the schizophrenics be able to comprehend what the person was saying ?

      If suddenly the manner through which I perceive change changed, would I be able to understand the reference of the two paradigms? Or would I think that something just changed? Would I reduce that fundamental shift in perception back to just the equivocal change that I’ve always know, and just figure it’s run-of-the-mill another kind of change, or would something significantly alter in what the human being is in itself?

      And in his much as Philosophy. wants to argue, all the way extended through the postmoderns, that we do not know things in itself, In what way or what argument could I put forth to that Kantian view to allow a different view? Becuase everything I would say would gain meaning from that subjective lack. ?

      .

      1. The “we” is not problematic but a different angle of analysis.

        You are talking phenomenology which they don’t. I think of the “we” as a consensus of minimum social cohesion or understanding. The human mind, since you mention Kant, functions in a certain way that we perceive things in a certain way generally speaking. As for representation and interpretation, this is a different story

      2. Yes I agree. The we as social …
        But also there was not too long ago and yet still, a “we” that was invisibly sustaining racist practices at least in the US. So to some people, the we meant something different and communication was not taking place.

        It took hundreds of years. And yet still people can’t see. They are totally unable to comprehend.

        Before this simple reality could be spoken about and communication could take place among the larger more inclusive we. Someone from the ‘not we’ has to find a way to breach that ‘we’ limit that was automatically assumed to encompass all human beings.

        This happened with racial being. Could it happen with philosophical being ?

      3. I view D and G as dealing with phenomenology. I see metaphysics in general as phenomenological even though the strict sense chops history and thought differently.

        But see. I need help in that area also. Becuase I tend to generalize without seeing that others don’t view it that way.

      4. Did you know that there was a guy, I forget his name, Who actually came up with a mental disease for slaves who try to escape from their masters?

        .Literally. The common view was that black people were actually inferior and so there was a whole science that was developing around establishing northern Europeans as the paramount of human evolutionary development.

        Even if a black slave was able to tell these people that I am not mentally ill but I just don’t want to be a slave no more, It would be understood in the context of a mental illness. Even though to us that sentence seems so plain and makes sure sense and it’s clear, it would not be understood that way as a concept but would be understood as an expression of irrationality and evidence for why the black person is inferior.

        Now, I’m not saying that philosophy is necessarily racist. I’m not making that correlation. But I am suggesting that in the same way, this same kind of manner of viewing, Philosophy, as an assumed ubiquity, as though it is dealing with this one common thing that occurs everywhere in humanity along a flat equally accessible plain of concept and cognition, etc. could be holding back another kind of understanding that perhaps could be more true and in fact could explain what Philosophy has been doing historically.

      5. Oh no, philosophy has always been against the mainstream of thinking. Aristotle was against the bad treatment of slaves which was back then a bold move. Philosophers made the revolutions everywhere specially in Europe. So it has never been an assumed ubiquity and every philosopher dealt with the same phenomenon differently; hence the many philosophical currents

      6. What I am indicating is an ability to conceive. If I am unable to see black people as intelligent, then even if they use words and organizations of terms that i use, I will not be able to understand them.

        If I say to you “the tree is green”. Is it possible that every time I say it, you will hear “beans are round”?

        I am saying that philosophy presently may not be able to hear about the tree. That every time the tree is spoken about, philosophy sees “beans are round”.
        It is not mere individual ability to conceive or perceive upon a flat ubiquitous semantic ontology if potential. It is that philosophers, as a category, may be taught to see in only one manner. And so every time something is proposed, philosophy ‘conveys’ a meaning that is not true to the original intension. Derrida has two meanings that he does not explore, not a multiplicity of meaning that people interpret. One meaning is the multiplicity; the other meaning is that there is only two manners of intension. Difference between in the real multiplicity; difference as difference is the description of how that is it occuring. It is not an argument of negating opposing positions through argument; it is a description of the situation as it appears truly.

        In this way, communication is not taking place. Sure; something that philosophy calls communication is occurring, but communication is not taking place in the sense of a=b, b=c thus a=c. What may be occurring is that philosophy, due to its ideological determination of freedom and post modern phenomenal intention, comes to the regular conclusion that a is equaling d. Every time. Just as blacks, at one time and place, were obviously inferior — as an analogy.

      7. Can you give me an example of philosophy conveying a meaning that is not true to the original intention? And are you using the word intention as meaning?

      8. See, this is a difficult thing to discuss as specific argumentative examples. This is why I talk about description as opposed to argument. But I need someone To engage with me in this way, the way that you are, to help me clarify or gather the right words, the correct closet structure, to convey what I’m talking about.

        Phenomenology to me encompasses all the philosophers from Kant up until our current continental philosophers. In general. And what I think that I’m finding out is, the discussion of ontology and metaphysics, I see this discussion as a phenomenological discussion. Because what I understand is phenomenology is the phenomenon of self and world. From what I understand from all the various authors that I read despite their various arguments, is that they are all, like the infamous Buddhist blind monks, Speaking of the elephant from their individual positions. In short they are all talking about the same thing in different ways, and in fact, as I might argue, they are all saying the same thing, but using different terms.

        This is how I distinguish the two routes. One of the routes sees terms as indeed identifying particular in specific objects, and or involved in the process of filling out what the object is in itself, but all the while arguing that it is not involved in that process, i.e., everything is relative, we are in a negotiation, it’s just an ongoing discussion, etc. wow I do you call that situation “real”, I also talk about how such methods inherent to that activity are redundant and contradictory.

        And so I move to say, without attempting to negate that real situation, and neither creating an argument to reduce it to what I’m talking about, as if this other route explains the former route, such that that first real route must necessarily fall under the jurisdiction of this other way that I’m talking about — I say that this other way, this other route, does not function by the same real rules of philosophical interaction. In fact it is a non-philosophical situation in the sense that Fracios Laruelle likewise describes.

        And so that’s why I say it is exceedingly difficult to be talking philosophically about Philosophy. because it is assumed whenever you use the word philosophy that all the sudden we find back into this typical, traditional, real situation that everyone has access to.

        I am saying that indeed there is a route that everyone does have access to and I’m not negating it or arguing that it is false or anyway saying that it doesn’t do work or it isn’t useful.

        And then I’m saying there’s this other route that is able to describe that situation.

        Is that making sense at all?

      9. And I could be incorrect, But I think structuralism and post structuralism talk about how things mean, like Foucault talking about how these terms have a history and the reason why terms mean various things are the reason why society is in its various ways. Like we can decode ideology. Like the Frankfurt school talking about media and art and things like that. I see that kind of critical theory that points to politics as ultimately missing the human being, which is to say, as I just put in my little post about Peterson: it proposes to be able to grasp large ideological structures without ever attending to the person that is proposing these ideological structures. And the argument is put forth that the subject is of these ideological structures instead of the other way around.

        I think the analysis of marks which sees a transition, like I believe Adorno talks about Marx — if I can begin to incorporate this analysis of counseling theory here — That the structure of consciousness in the Freudian sense which posits a super ego, and ego which mediates that then with the Id—. These structures, these ideological structures, the super ego of rules and norms: it is utterly phenomenological, created by consciousness, as a part of the structure of consciousness.

        It is not something that exists outside of the phenomenon. It is something that corresponds with phenomena.

        It is the world, the phenomenological world.

        From my understanding, the structuralists supposed to be able to analyze this kind of “super ego“ ideological world to argue back into what the subject is, as if the ego is indeed interacting with something that is not it something that is outside of the subject, as though what is outside is actually creating the subject.

        This is the opposite of what I’m talking about. Hence counseling and psychotherapy.

        Am I totally off mark?

    3. A computer may not perceive, but we can speak of computers perception. We do it all the time. We humanize machines and we talk about them knowing and perceiving and asking and answering and all sorts of cognitive functions.

      Why should the human being be exempt from this ability to shift through categorical situations?

      1. Touché. Ok then. The human categories should be exempt and they can be exempt.

        Then I might ask if communication can occur between those conceptual paradigms ?

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