Reason and It’s Other
Conventional philosophy insists that there must be a unitive reason in order for philosophy to function.
I think that many people read “the questioning of reason” to mean that anything else has to be something “not reason”. I say that this is a fundamental mistake in the estimation of what it is to be human, and I propose that there is another type of reason that does not reduce to that conventional philosophical unitive category. Either/or is one manner if discerning what is reasonable.
This is to say that if we are going to get anywhere philosophically then one would need to begin to see that what I am identifying as conventional philosophy is providing a certain function for the real world. And that to invoke a different reason does not thereby negate the function that conventional philosophy is enacting. Another reason can provide a different, and just as valid, function, including for the function “Reason”. What ever reasons Reason outlines, there can be another set of of Reason that is reasonable, without offsetting or proclaiming the ‘first’ reason invalid; this is the non-philosophical finding of Laurel: only the ‘first’ kind of Reason functions through invalidating it’s subjects.
Tis “other” function, though, is historically devalued to nothingness and negated through the conventional theological motion.
In order to get anywhere, one would need to suspend judgement and wish to see what is outside of its ontological (cosmological) surety.