The Ontological Argument

Conventional Philosophy is marked by its method that I call the ontological argument.

William Dilthey made a good statement that Wiki incorporates, which is a good example of the conventional project:

“….[Dilthey] argues that ‘scientific explanation of nature’ (erklären) must be completed with a theory of how the world is given to human beings through symbolically mediated practices. To provide such a theory is the aim of the philosophy of the humanities—a field of study to which Dilthey dedicated his entire academic career.”

We have found, though, Despite if we are taking about symbols, thoughts or language, that far from ever being able to arrive at such a bridge, the conventional effort Instead serves to consolidate the subject to ideology. The bridge is always a religious justification on one hand, and scholastic dogmatics on the other.

Hence, the project now must take on a new sheen.

An ontological argument has a topic of Being, but its purpose, which is to say, the use of conventional philosophy, is to place the subject in a real world of sense. It then moves to suggest that it is arguing real Being — which it is — but it is involved with a religious effort to justify the congregant.

This, of course is not an argument. It is a description of the situation. Where the description is seen as an argument, which is to say, where it is understood as showing something that is wrong or incorrect about a current state of being, thereby we have the conventional philosophy which wants to take up at the yoke of arguing its ontology.

Because, we are no longer concerned with what, say, I might be existing as in truth, or for real in any world. We already know what that is and how it operates. This does not mean that somehow we need to try and operate differently; it merely means that now we have identified a human being as to its objectivity in the universe. The only revolt that occurs in this realization of the human situation is a religious move back into the ontological argumentation: an justification of the free agent.

And I will emphasize that I am not suggesting that somehow the free agent doesn’t exist or is operating under some sort of illusion.

When we figure out how a car engine works we just don’t suddenly decide that it doesn’t exist; it doesn’t just fall apart.

The problem now is coming to terms with what we have realized.

In other words, I make a distinction between that activity which joins causality to sense, finality to contingency . And the efficient body of philosophy.

As a science restricts, agency expands and vice-versa.

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