Subjective Overdetermination?

The idea that everyone is having unique subjective experiences upon text may not be so significant as the issue of communication.

It may very well be that we merely have not developed the terms under which such individual and primary experiences are allowed to be conveyed. Which is to say, to then see that such individual experiences are not so unique nor infinite in their variety.

This is a new light, a new angle on things perhaps. It would explain a whole vector of philosophy; in short, I think it is possible that it would outline subjectivity to make the contents of the human experience explainable in terms of natural occurrence, rather than transcendental possibility.

In very short, it might be able to open a world intersubjectivity that has so far been closed for the sake of “individual interpretation”.Basically it would challenge what offends us in the idea of individuality. It could tell us that the idea of individuality is a mythological construct, and It could have the potential to find actual occurrences of symbolic meaning that are not based in intentional psychoanalytic archetypes. In other words, we might find out what the human being actually does, rather than relying upon discursive slight of hand type arguments of proof based in apologetic philosophical postures.

A pivotal question could ask how it was that ‘science’ as we know it arose. Did someone “make a good argument” that everyone then ‘saw’ how science, the object of science’, was solute? Why should an argument create anything viable for me? I think a question would have to be answered that addresses why would an argument be able to prove something to me in the sense of objectivity. I think the answer to the question of how the object of science cane about would say something about how our current philosophical subjectivity could be a kind of religious formation, an “idol” of belief.


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