The facination with the Speculative Realists quickly faded due to the contradictory pose invested in the following (and like) quote from the introduction to the book “The Speculative Turn”:
“The origins of this correlationist turn lie in Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy, which famously abjured the possibility of ever knowing a noumenal realm beyond hu- man access. In Kant’s famous Copernican revolution, it is no longer the mind that con- forms to objects, but rather objects that conform to the mind. Experience is structured by a priori categories and forms of intuition that comprise the necessary and universal basis for all knowledge. Yet the price to be paid for securing this basis is the renunci- ation of any knowledge beyond how things appear to us. Reality-in-itself is cordoned off, at least in its cognitive aspects.
Lee Braver’s fine book recently showed that this Kantian prohibition, with its anti- realist implications, has wound its way through the continental tradition, taking hold of nearly every major figure from Hegel to Heidegger to Derrida.8 While for Kant there re- mains the possibility of thinking the noumenal (if not knowing it), Hegel absolutizes the correlate to encompass all that exists: his critique of the noumenal renders it merely a phenomenal illusion, thus ‘completing’ the critical philosophy by producing an absolute idealism. This effacement of the noumenal continues with phenomenology, as ontolo- gy becomes explicitly linked with a reduction to the phenomenal realm. As Braver out- lines, Heidegger furthers the anti-realist project by rejecting the possibility of Absolute Knowledge as the singular and total self-understanding of the Absolute Subject. Final- ly, with Derrida the mediation of language becomes all-encompassing, as the phenom- enal realm of subjectivity becomes infested with linguistic marks. Throughout this proc- ess, any possibility of a world independent of the human-world correlate is increasingly rejected (as is nicely symbolized by Heidegger’ famous crossing-out of the word ‘Being’).
This general anti-realist trend has manifested itself in continental philosophy in a number of ways, but especially through preoccupation with such issues as death and finitude, an aversion to science, a focus on language, culture, and subjectivity to the detriment of material factors, an anthropocentric stance towards nature, a relinquish- ing of the search for absolutes, and an acquiescence to the specific conditions of our historical thrownness. We might also point to the lack of genuine and effective politi- cal action in continental philosophy—arguably a result of the ‘cultural’ turn taken by Marxism, and the increased focus on textual and ideological critique at the expense of the economic realm.”
What appeared way cool a few years ago was becuase the authors were blinded by thier need to produce material.
Most probably , the upcoming (a year out? Two? Less?) explanation and argument will show how SR is caught in its own illusion , and how this illusion is only found due to the SR move. We will show how the SR exhibit a kind of bad faith we have not come upon before in the philosophical world. They are responsible for their going down in history as the mark of disolution, which is to say, as the mark of the ending of modern philosophy (which is really the effort to perpetuate modernity), the ‘proof’ of the mythological cycle. And this becuase they came upon something new only in the narrowness of thier intuited, at that, misappropriated Kantian analysis.
The way into this veiw is to understand that despite what ‘turn’ they would propose, Kant was always involved with what is real. So it is, in so much as the SRs might have proposed a return to what is real, that they have shown thier hand, and this, again, despite what they might argue. This is the significance of the philosophical divergence.
The recently infamous ‘end of…(human, history, philosophy, etc…including the post- and trans- objects) shows that the SRs and others are ultimately involved in the same Kantian limit that they decry, albeit in denial of this facet of thier proposal for the purpose of satisfying a kind of fad: Reality itself.
Hence, the reasons they pose for such a turn, are the same reasons why they unwittingly expose their own pedagogical fault.
But does it and will it matter?
Most likely not. Real philosophical turns will continue.
And thus why will it ever matter? Becuase the truth is not interesting.
In fact, if you read the introduction to “The Speculative Turn”, it is obvious that the only motivation for this Speculative Turn is childish boredom (otherwise code for: I dont really understand. Lol) Look for youself: The Speculative Turn pdf.
(I am the biggest dork – or for those accross the pond: wanker – in all the kingdom of Earth.🙃 but it dont mean im wrong.)