Below is a Cool little synopsis of SR, but id like to just address that last bit at the end: “opposed to correlationalism”.
Here is a great example of the issue i treat: Is there a difference between a Truth of a statement, and the argumentative concept of it? What is the difference?
For What is correlationalism? We are able to define it in all sorts of ways, bur do any of these definitions ever get to what is true of correlationalist?
So contrary to the argumentative route, i would take the truth of the meaning of the definition to mean that there is no argumentative way to remove one from the corralative reality. But this is to say only in as much a one might want to ‘take sides’.
SR may be an argumentative position opposed to correlationalism, but it seems more proper to say that one can only exit what is correlational by suspending its meaning, by having it mean nothing that can be applicable to everyday life. Because when one applies such argument to everyday life, the theory goes out the window because the fact of living in reality is that the theory automatically departs from it because it is correlational.
The unpopular view thus finds how SR, and like positions, is faulty in itself as a real position. The only manner of actually leaving what is correlational is not to be opposed to it (as Harman says below of SR) , rather, it is to see that there are two situations that do not oppose one another yet do not intersect or otherwise encounter each other except at particular moments or junctures of theoretical meaning.
For really if we take all these authors, that he mentions below in the repost, for what they mean, then we have to say that Kant is right: in what manner can we ever get outside of our conception? When can we ever conceive something that is not a human conception? I would submit that there is no argument that is not a concept, and so to somehow encapsulate this Kantian notion as just another idea amongst ideas, as though his idea designates one true thing that we can get beyond by coming up with some other sort of idea, say for example that we can speculate about things that are beyond what is located of the concept — all this is a concept. That is what correlationism is. Once we take that notion and we encapsulated into a term we effectively have made it a true object, which is to say merely an idea amongst ideas, bracketing things as we go along in order to come to things that are more true than other things or argumentatively true and so much is that one agent of transcendence might argue this but another asian of transcendence argues that: all of it takes place within a conceptual universe.
There is only one way to get out of this correlational last cycle and that is to not deposit things in opposition, to not stratify the human being in a common horizon of intuitive capacity, based upon the central phenomenal thinker.
And the only way to do this is to take the unpopular option.
The Universe in a Nutshell: A Simple Guide to Speculative Realism*
Why do things happen in a predictable way? Back in the Eighteenth Century, David Hume asked that simple question. In other words, why do some events necessarily follow other events? For example, if you were to hit a billiard ball why wouldn’t it just float into the sky? This is what philosophers call ‘causal necessity’. […]
Harman, Meillassoux, Kant, Ontology, Philosophy, Speculative Realism, Realism