In certain kind of spaces in order to find the truth one must approach it, not as a skeptic doubting as we come upon it, but as if it is really true – but without the ‘as if’. In these particular spaces , one must find the truth of a thing, find it true, in order to be able to assess whether or not it is actually true.
In an odd sort of irony what I’ve gathered to call the ‘pocket veto’ concerns The situationof continental philosophy. So in a certain manner of speaking the truth that the continentals find, has been discovered through an approach of doubt that sees this doubt as having an ability to discover the truth. But the actual situation, which can be said to reverberate or resonate Kierkegaards doubt, is that the doubt is a particular subsequent manner of having already found the truth, it is a kind of deceptive process, The one we typically associate with philosophical irony, as many people note of Socrates.
We might see that the analytical and the continental philosophers are not involved in any real difference, but that the Single method, what we can call the conventional philosophical method, reveals itself to two routes, which would not disclose as involving two routes, that can afford a kind of ploy perpetrated upon one by the other.
This is due to the common manner of appropriating objects, to the assumed common orientation upon objects. As Laruelle at least suggest and places, this common manner is based in what I call The transcendental clause. It is by this clause that the all of history can be written as a religion.
One matter of discerning this situation whereby the common route may be used to take advantage, I call real and not real. Where as the discussion below about non-existant objects is still too early to apply to my discussion of real or not real, which also concerns orientations upon objects, The re-post below nevertheless can offer a certain framework by which to approach the idea whereby continental philosophy might be distinguished for what it does.
Originally posted on Plato’s Footnote: From time to time I like to bring to people’s attention pieces of technical writing in philosophy that I think deserve a wider audience than the academic one. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s article on nonexistent objects, by Maria Reicher, is one of these. It’s fairly long (28 pages in the…