I am enjoying the description inherent in AGENT SWARM’s last few posts.
While his project works on a different plane, if you will, than mine, one of the issues I constantly address is why or what I am doing when I reference some ‘great Big’ philosophical names.
Am I referencing as proof, or am I referencing as verification?
I think Terrence at SWARM is saying, in a certain sense, that the ‘little Deleuzians’ are referencing for proof, whereas Deleuze himself was offering verification.
The difference to me is the difference that I talk about in my book “Non-philosophy and Aphilosophy“; namely, that which concerns what I term the ‘philosophical revolution’, as well as what my next book “The Moment of Decisive Significance” speaks more in depth about, again, what I call one’s ‘orientation upon objects’.
(Im sorry; Im finding I cannot help but plug my books because they talk and explain the issues involved, and I don’t really feel like having to spell it out all again. I mean; isn’t that at least one reason why we write books?)
All this is because Im not sure why I would need to reference authors I have read. Can someone tell me? Because (as I explain in “Nonphilosophy“), once we understand the issue then there is really nothing that anyone has not already said about it, and if there is something, then it is subsequent the ‘moment’ and likewise really only saying things that follow sensibly from their originating configuration of meaningful terms coupled with the vector implied by the originating clause. If I were to reference all that has been said about an issue that Ive read and all the authors that I have come accross that may have gone into myself coming to any particular meaningful juncture to be able write something down and prove my argument, the bibliography and notes section of the book would surely be many times longer that the piece in which Im trying to say something. In fact, it is very possible I would need the length of book just to justify a small 6 paragraph blog post; to truncate it would necessarily be a lie and largely false; it would be false to say that any one person proved to me such and such to allow me to make an argument in the attempt to prove what Im saying is correct. In this sense, I may not reference Zizek, say, to necessarily prove anything, that is, unless I am attempting to prove that indeed he said such a thing; the fact that Zizek said something particular, it is referenced because the particular reference verifies that the issue at hand has been spoken about before as well as is continually being talked about in various ways.
The issue also thus indicates a divergence in the appropriation of discourse because then all the ‘little’ people can indeed reference the same parts of Zizek to prove that they have a valid position in the real discussion, just as the ‘little Deluezians’ might reference Delueze to stake their claim in the battle of identities (which ironically would be then the ‘greater’ vehicle).
Part of this whole thing thereby is the manner that the issue is made to be distant yet in the same move viewed as talking about something intimate and close. Theory is used in place of talking about the issue in a manner that appears to be addressing something intimate. Here is an example. Granted, there is a certain artistic dinension there, but What occurs in such theory often functions at once for a ‘bringing into the fold’ of identities such that the agent of transcendence (the real human subject) understands that his or her particular intelligence or educational privilege has been communicated to. The agent is thus reified in its reality through the displacement of the experience to that of a transcendent significance, which is to say, that they have ‘been chosen’. The agent does not see this move as involving any transcendence due to the already made investment in real estimations, this is to say, their individual identity. The true nature of consciousness is of no concern to them; even while they will read some nice phrases by their authors that surely are talking about significant issues of Being, existence, humanity and consciousness, they thus will often miss the meaning as they as involved in establishing their identity, the identity ‘chosen’ by the transcendental state, of the transcendental communication of intimate communion across the unitive ontological scheme, even while such a transcendence is debated pro and con.
This is not to say that conventional theory does not have its place.
But here (above) is the issue showing itself for those who would indeed be involved in developing a science of the human phenomenon. A necessary divergence is indicated. Not as a reductionist resort or default to the common argument of proof; rather, first as a development of what is being verified in the investigation as facts apart from the common never-ending real mythological negotiation of relative True Objects. (Again, some of these terms I develop in my books. Sorry.)