Once the aphilosophical extension is admitted of non-philosophy, a divergence is qualified, a route to speak of things emerges in solution. No longer do we thus plead toward the one ideological state, no longer do we have the post-modern problem where all must answer to the one discursive real reduction, where all resides within a single potential of multiples evidenced of discourse. The significance is difference that is not recouped by the conventional reckoning; different as different.
What this means is that the world did not end. What this means is that the insufficiency involved with discourse for its objects did not bring a catastrophe, but that the catastrophe was missed. The catastrophe merely induced another move, but that this move could no longer cater to the support of the indication of its object; through the conventional method, the object reduces to nothing.
Now, the significance of this move to nothingness is that one would think that in as much as discourse can indicate true things, that the truth of itself, the truth of discourse revealing that discourse itself is based in nothing substantial, that the world would end, that the meaning would have lead itself along the concordance of true worldly universal objects such that the found basis of nothingness would indeed also indicate that the substantiality of the world was nothing: The world ends in as much as discourse was revealing through its true method the truth of the universe.
But this did not happen; rather the end did not occur in the way it should have. So what happened was a fracturing. The intrinsic mythology of the True Object was revealed to its fallacious basis, but then nothing happened. Nothing occurred as an imposition, an effect upon meaning such that any and all idealism not longer holds its deferred status; that is, every proposition of truth relies upon an unspoken ideal by which it has substance, and it is this ‘ideal’ substance that is compared in a real discussion looking for truth. Every discussion that proposes to find a further truth through the investigation into the term, the Object, relies upon an ideal situation that is deferred in the very activity, deferred for the purpose of the investigation itself. So, once the discussion itself is brought into question by its own method, instead of “The End of The World”, the world continues albeit as the common and continuing reality. The conventional theorists stand stunned for a moment, but then merely continue to rely upon the induction — but at this point something has changed that allows us to see into what is and has been occurring. The discourse (historical philosophical discourse) has been presumed to have been moving along a true path, the path that is found through a particular methodological approach. This method has yielded a sort of progression of thought that, in a haphazard way, like a sort of evolutionary tree where some branches fade out and others that continue argue a type of necessarily true adaptation, lead to a dissolution of its method (it’s route). This dissolution then shows that it was incorrect in its proposal, so a new proposal is made. What is significant is that the route was seen to be yielding a more true situation, but when the more true situation is come upon to mean that the route itself is false, this conclusion is deemed incorrect because we human theorists are still there to think about things, still involved with the effective deferment as if there is no deferment, still involved with the conventional faith.
The difference that occurs with this type of conclusion, though, is that where the contradiction occurs, the ‘one’ route bifurcates. On one side, the route of the ‘same’, the real route, continues along the way just described. Those of the conventional faith continue in their method, finding an eternal presence deferred I to various historical and temporal Objects. On the other side, the contradiction is upheld.
It is for this reason that the alternate, the divergent route, must be determined along a different line, must distinguish itself against the conventional route. This distinction for the purposes of continuing with truth, instead of an assumption upon what is given, is the reason that we have what Francios Laruelle coins ‘philosophical fiction’, or ‘philo-fiction’, because it is the real route that asserts power and decides how terms are to be used. The alternate route thus becomes a type of ‘fiction’, but a fiction that is not now an irony that is ‘more real’, not a speaking from underneath, not an ‘actually more true’, not an indication that reality is some sort of illusion; on the profoundly significant contrary, this ‘fiction’ is in fact, not real. It is placed with reference to what is real by the distinction that it is not real but nevertheless true. Nevertheless, it is ‘fake’ to ‘false’ only in the designation where what is real is the same as what is true: Conventional reality. In this sense, what is not real but true is that which offends conventional faith in the True Object.
The distinction is made clear in the book “Non-Philosophy and Aphilosophy” with the extrapolation of meaning to its necessary ends as it is seen to be involved with True Objects. The distinction occurs along the lines of the appropriation of discourse, over the view that understands discourse as referencing True Objects.
The ends of the discourse based upon True Objects yields conceptual ‘truths’, such as philosophical ‘nothingness’, or some transcendental ‘oneness’. The idea that we are actually of a one-ness and separation is a kind of illusion of sorts is exactly a conceptual ideal, a scaffolding of sorts that arises within a structure of meaning that grants activity in life a justification or purpose for being. But the fact is, if we really look beyond such Objectival justifying idols, we do not live that way. Still before us is a rock, a car, a tree, a cup of coffee; the ‘fact’ that their separation might be of a sort of illusion is merely a conceptual apparatus that only comes into play when we begin to question and answer along a particular vector of meaning, a vector that is supplied beforehand by the situation wherein the question and answer arises (the conventional method; the philosophical decision); indeed, this is also a real conception, a real justification of situation. So it is this situation can be described as nothing less than absurd.
Hence we are no longer concerned with such objectival situations but are entirely concerned with his discourse is appropriated. It is from this standpoint, from within the contradiction, that a total description of religious and ideological foundations may arise.
In essence; it is from this absurd situation that occurs outside of conventional faith, that a distruction of the transcendent may occur in a Truly Objectival manner. In other words, after, what could be called, the aphilosophical explication, no spiritual and or religious institution will remain standing in as much as they may be understood actually true conditions of reality; in other words, religious type situations will be seen to occur only in reality, which is to say, actually and truly through faith, itself as a real objectival reference. The irony coming to bare against its displacement will yield for transcendental objects no place to hide.
But of course, this will not occur in reality…