The issue of the subject is one of mis-affection. What we can say is the allure to many of philosophy concerning the subject, the description that ‘calls’ many to philosophy’s endeavor, but then ‘traps’ them in a mistaken real-true calling of theory, the deception of methodological reduction that draws them into a vicious circle of argument, that seduces them to identify themselves with the cycle and the subjective nil it incorporates, that brings them to invest their soul in a ‘soul-killing’ venture defending identities that are in truth polemical and non-identical as their reduction only yields effective defenses of real positions, positions based in inherent offense — this route distances the human being from itself through theory that is inherently objective and non-integrative in method; reductive but not integrative.
The traditional philosophical route deceives by providing a view of reality without the involved human being; which is to say, the manner by which it accounts for the human being is always through a particular manner of objectifying the subject in theory and placing it as an affected entity in a further objective case generally called science (evolution, biology, physiology, and psychology). In this way, philosophy has historically failed the impetus of its instigation; its course has always been away from its subjective bearings, even as it is supposed to be concerning or involving the human being. Those philosophers who have attempted to re-instill life back into this death-route are those in whom we can view irony; the presence of what Heidegger identified as Dasein is noticeable in the inherently objective method as irony. All such authors can be viewed in this way; they are the ones who at least resisted investment; those who are so ‘wholeheartedly’ deceived are thus received as a blatant mistake, or at least as authors of critical ideological and political theory, their discourses various treatises upon the manner in which the subject is an object (subject-object) shows how thoroughly and deep their deception is, for their offerings are upon the altar of real-truth.
It is somewhat recently in the conventional reckoning of history that we can see this discrepancy being felt. Heidegger himself becomes an ironic figure, an actual transitional presence in the scene of history, his profound discourse and his amazingly enigmatic yet somewhat obvious tentative position back of Nazi Germany. Dasein being a description of being is thus destruction of its presence as present, as its relinquishing or ‘giving up’ of itself to the philosophical objectification is its destruction, but in a particular obscene fashion: Heidegger viewed his effort as a kind of course of enlightenment. And it is thus the sadness that accompanies this complete acquiescence, this willingness to give up something so precious to a cause that appears to be working on its behalf, but is rather working for its own interest, that of gaining investors and enacting oppression and nothing else — it is no wonder we have the post and post post modern authors (can we say now that we may have gained an ante-modern situation ?? [note: This is not anti-modern]) address the impetus for World War 2.
The world let Hitler rise by its complicity in the manifest destiny gained through Hegelian justification of consciousness in history; the (Western?) world was all too ready to see its baby (the exalted subject) vindicated in industry and economy. But then what does this baby do? Badiou puts it so nicely: It ‘voids’ that which is not in its ‘historical’ interest. Post WW2 then sees Sartre express the confusion that remains after the subject encounters its nemesis, but again as a now reassigned, redefined object: nothingness. The post-modernists then attempt to resuscitate and reinvigorate the subject, but again, in the mis-appropriation of the philosophical vehicle (taking the objective route by which to locate and establish the subject), the world reacts strongly: Irony shifts from the ‘One’ subject-object and its propriety, to ‘the many’ subject-objects, and all the multiplicity of multiple possibility located in the objective world. Ideology and hegemony become center; power becomes the issue. Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze and Guatari, in their last ditch effort, serve to finally place the subject in its grave. The subject admits that it has no basis, that it is a discursive aspect located in the possibility of insanity: That it is now but an ideological object. The world cries and complains in emphatic and sarcastic tones, decrying at once it’s own death while watching itself die. (Zizek? “Living In The End Times” ?)
Lyotard clearly outlines the problem: No communication is occurring. The subject is never able to communicate itself, it is always commandeered by the objective reckoning. The subject has a case, but it cannot be heard; the subject is indeed not dead, just mute. The extent of such a revealing and its repercussions will have to wait. The mute has found a voice; Zizek explains how this subject is reaffirmed in its nothingness; the subject is a space of nil in the conflation of objects — and he proves this by his enacting discourse as a presence of the subject. Just prior to this, Laruelle shows how discourse might carry the subject, and Badiou shows the situation of how this carrying enlists a silence (void) by the very presence the object (event). Harman and Miellassoux complete this passage from death to ‘un-death’ by pushing this silence to its proper objective place: The silent partner, the ghost writer.
The Exposition of the Significant Event is an effort to describe logistics, to show how the subject resides in silence, how historical reality is situated against this silence, how this silence is used and exploited in the continuing objective philosophy, and what this situation means for the human being in the world.
I don’t know if this is possible, or even if I will actually proceed to fulfill this statement (I hope it is good for what follows) but we have only to do that we do. We shall see what is uncovered in this adventure.