See that this blog is not so much an assertion of what I believe is so correct, but more a working space where I play with ways to situate discourse and test out the ideas they purport against what I am trying to say (which is why I would like feedback).
Strong words, dare I admit, of that last segment. In fact, I’m feeling I’m getting a little too defensive. The blog format is beginning to yield its limitations and I think I’m trying to plow through it, to demand upon…what? Ultimately, upon myself. Upon my silence. As if I can just yell loud enough I might break the partition. Very few people comment, and while these are valuable and appreciated, they do not constitute the attacks I seek. So I cannot but wonder if it is because I make no sense, or I make too much sense. I don’t know because few people have engaged.
And this blank brings me back to the impetus of this whole thing. To expose. All this so far has been and is preliminary, and I suppose I attempt to address the philosophers that see this foreplay argument and discussion as the primary issue, to get them to see it is really the result, the subsequence of the issue. That the re-present-ational edge of contemporary philosophy is really the dabbling in the whitewash, of subsequent issues.
As a side here, we might venture to suggest that what we have is a world that may be situated opposite to how university philosophy departments like to introduce existentialism. It may be not so much that there is a ‘real world’, and then, how Kiekegaard puts it, there might be a teleological suspension of this ethical real world; rather, we might see that it is the real world that is in suspension.
Thus I have said we recede. We have discussed what is subsequent first because it is represents the barrier to significance, and by approaching in this way come to the point of contention, thereby to be able to discuss what is first instead what is usually seen as last, as the object.
Thus also I have said we diverge from the (as Harman seems to suggest that Heidegger advocates) inadequate philosophical discourse of True Objects.
The issue is one’s orientation upon the object.
So I repeat myself because the format of the blog seems to lend itself to having to reiterate what has already been said in order to say something more. I feel a book is on its way.
As the previous segment: Harman wrote this synopsis of Heidegger, and he even admits in it that he thinks Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of our time. Now, if these statements are true, then we can say that Harman most probably not only understands Heidegger very well, but agrees with him in much of what he is saying, that is, Harman must also see that Heidegger is putting forth a description that is a good description of the issues, good, valid solutions to good and valid problems.
What I am saying is that if Harman does indeed reside well within the situation above there in the previous paragraph, then his first and second objections are forced, derivative not from Heidegger’s meaning; the objections are non sequitur to Heidegger’s ideas. Not ‘objections’ but completely estranged, fabricated. How is this? To put it in Heidegger’s terms, which Harman aptly explains (strangely enough) and to address his second objection: the facticity of being itself contains and accounts for change as part of its historical environment of facticity. If indeed the facticity for Harman is the arising of the question of change in his environment then it is exactly the occasion for which Harman is incorrect in his operation (see below).
Secondly, as to his first objection: Heidegger’s claim that there is only world when Dasein is present is really saying that such world, the work of objects, arise as such only with the instance of the human ‘being there’, that without Dasein, there is nothingness, which ironically is the ‘ground’ of the facticial event. Harman rejects this privilege and allows for the Dasein of podiums and fire and paper and such, but we could see that this rejection is based in the offense against the essential subject of a different privilege, of agency, the individual (see the next segment as well as previous post in the Significant Event). The question that must be asked then has to do with what facticity actually denotes, which then brings to the front the point of the issue with Harman; one of two situations must account for Harman’s mistaken digression from the philosopher he so thoroughly admires and understands:
1) Harman does not understand Heidegger for Heidegger’s meaning, and so is involved in the conventional mistake, as I offer the description by Lacan and Zizek (previous post of the Significant Event);
2) Harman does understand and so is contriving a position that blatantly ignores the meaning of the facticity of being, and so is being deceptive. This is to say one of the subsequent issues:
A). Harman is being deceptive as a strategy;
B). He is lying about his admiration for Heidegger and his scholarship is thereby called into question.
If indeed (1) is the answer, then it is easy to address Harman to the mistake as he is involved in the conventional faith in the True Object. If (2), then we have a marker of the pocket veto and evidence of the opacity of his proposals. (B) can be properly dismissed as a route back into (1).
Next we will address next some particular Object Ontology ideas.