SE part 10ai, part A.
As this essay is developing into what may be proper for a small book, I had to take a moment and wait for something to occur, since I was beginning to feel that this essay is tending away from the blog format.
Without introduction as to its applicability to this ongoing essay of mine , I might direct the reader to a paper that I found through the blog post by Synthetic Zero. Called “Frontiers of Manipulation” by Reza Negarestani, his paper can be viewed at http://blog.urbanomic.com/cyclon/Frontiers-of-Manipulation.pdf. For, what we have been waiting for, and wait for, philosophically is the proper occasion for the situation of terms.
So shall we continue with an interlude.
Part of the point of contention and the Significant Event concerns the route by which philosophical discourse is assumed to have been come upon and thus arrived for and in experience. We propose here two conditions that may represent a cleft that is overlooked in the assessment of philosophical discourse and its foundations, what we might call ‘the coincidental inspired’ and the ‘the information interested’ routes.
Take for example a young student inquisitive of existence. She is reading and say she comes upon Sartre and something in Sartre’s work elicits a ‘ah ha’ moment where the student sees that Sarte is making sense for what the student is wondering about, that Sarte is explaining something that she sees is significant for an answer to an unknown question about being human in the world that seems to be upheld somehow in herself. Of course, this situation happens everywhere, and one could easily read any informational writing, from books on engineering, history, anthropology and sociology, literature and poetry, to the DSM IV, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, or the Bible, and have such a cognition, or Alistar Crowley, J. Krishnamurti, or the Vedas, or even Dr. Wayne Dyer or Marianne Williamson. But the movement here suggested is vertical, deep and motivated by a signal of question and answer that is ambiguous maybe at first, but refined in process.
Also we have another student who is curious, but when she reads she is merely acquiring information, information that is interesting to her and holds significance for this and that issue, but information nonetheless. Like a neutral being of process, her significance is in the absorption of information as to what it is suggesting a position for itself, as different positions can be gained from different authors, and through a gathering weighing of consideration, the reader can come to a position she most agrees with. The movement is horizontal and motivated by a deep interest in the uncovering the aspects of things of humanity and the world.
I am speaking quite generally as the distinction between these two people can easily be collapsed to represent a variety of routes, influences and impetuses involving both an innate question and curiosity for information. My intension here is not to arouse doubts and critiques over the possibility of this rather small and dry model of people, of how I am being too simple. So let us shorten our scope and speak specifically of philosophical interest, and see if I can get to the reason for my query set up by these types that will halt such skepticism for the sake of addressing what seems to me the more significant issue.
What should be noted of these encounters with knowledge is in what direction the students move. Inevitably, the readings will not answer the question entirely, but will leave some part of the hidden question of curiosity out of its answer or desire for information. So the student enquires further into her authors and materials found to be related to the initial inspiring reading. The question posed here asks about the nature of learning: Is the student of philosophy finding out about how she is actually manifested as a real human being? Or, is the student already manifested as a human being in the effort of looking for evidence of how this can be so? This is really the same question, but cleaved for the the purpose of the investigation. We are not necessarily evoking a rift in ontological and epistemological query; rather, this is a questioning of philosophy itself.
The issue I am getting at has to do with the human being and the question of existence, and if the traditional western philosophical heritage is 1) getting anywhere in the discussion, and 2) is really saying anything that is significant in its long and windy rhetoric that cannot or could not be found without it. The question thus centers more along the first type of student. For the question is really whether traditional philosophy is needed to answer the questions supposed of its answering.
— I would love some feedback.
End part A.