The Significant Event, Part 4a: The Problem with Speculative Realism.

Individuals nevertheless still have such significant experiences, and these experiences frame the existential problem noted above (part 3), or for my terms, how a person is oriented upon objects. The significant event, or more properly said, the question of the pocket veto distinguishes that which is fidelitous to the Event from that which finds recourse in the True Object of the pure multiple. This is to say that the question that is brought to bare of such event is referred to the question of its reality, as in the previous segment, the question “Is this real?” The answering of this question posed by the individual thus solves the irony present in the very situation, to wit, either I have been privy to a moment of inspiration that raises me above the State of Reality enough to be only at least partially subject to the State, and thereby be in a position to sufficiently address the oppression of the State, which is the real answer, the answer that derives from an (Kant) intuited object, the transcendent, or, I am not subject to the State.


We thus take the similarity between what I have just proposed and the Speculative Realists, Graham Harman and Quentin Miessaloux in particular, as an occasion by which to further the effort to gain the veto, but I will be addressing more of Quentin Miessaloux with his primacy of math over the tendency for transcendental thinking. It comes down to this, the issue brought up earlier in this extended essay: Even if mathematics reflects in an arch-fossil manner an object antecedent to thought, the conveyance of such object is subject to discourse of the strong correlationalist sort.

But we should take a moment to see what Speculative Realism really involves as a philosophical position (if that designation really refers anymore to any specificity of discourse).

The usual conventional philosophical paradigm involves the subject and the object, or what is found in the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum”. The veto we are after in these essays involves a significant event by which the split that identifies the subject and object becomes apparent. This split is the moment that can be addressed through considering the Cartesian/Copernican Revolution. The significance that SR is concerned with is this establishment, in simple meaning, the “I think, therefore I am”, a basic polemic between the thinking subject and its presence in the world, a presence that implicates a segregated element, whereby thought is distinguished from the object of its operation. This is where Graham Harman of noted Object Oriented Ontology takes up his solution by the object –> object as opposed to the subject –> object query –which is a real endeavor, a venture posed upon an un investigated given by which possibility may arise; hence ‘speculative realism’. The problem supposedly since that time of Descartes has been how to reconcile this apparent subject/object duality. The Speculative Realists propose that such a reconciliation is based upon an incorrect assessment of the situation at hand. It appears SR and I agree on this point, yet where the SR are involved with the discovering the object along a conventional (real) route, and while the subject is likewise tied into such an object, I propose and so venture towards the effect of human consciousness that allows for such posturing. The real objectival discursive situation marked by the SR, interestingly enough, creates a viable opening by which to discuss a necessary divergence from such a real conventional method. Knowing of how such conventional reality of the object may be addressed is an ironic venture.

The proposal of solving the Cartesian problem of the subject and the object along an objective path is dubious at best. For one, it supposes that humanity before a certain time had no such apprehension of duality. The problem is supposed particular, to have came about not merely at a specific time, but due to a specific discourse, which for such SR and object oriented philosophers, means a specific way of thinking, again indicating that thought and discourse are intertwined in a causal historical situation. While Graham Harman appears to reduce his Object Oriented problem to how two objects may touch — as we should see, the ‘object’ that is the Cartesian ‘subject’ and the ‘object’ that is the ‘object’, as well as ‘regular’ objects, thus may follow his description of what all objects actually are — so as to allow their interaction in reality, Quentin Miessalloux seems content to take the problem to correlationalist reasoning, where objects reflected in consciousness tend to argue back into present objects only, the discourse of objects relying upon a thinking subject that reasons objects back into the scheme of reason such that no object exists outside the knowing subject. He thereby argues due to this posed limit that there are objects outside of the correlationalist cycle.

Yet despite what discursive moves one may make to therefore be able to attain a relationship consistent entirely of objects, the question thus begs its own determination:

Is thought influenced by discourse or is discourse influenced by thought?

Is there an influence that bridges these elements in a directional manner?

Was thought going on and then discourse came about due to the human being thinking?

Was there some sort of communication occurring before thought came to be thought?

Did discourse arise in the same motion as thought?

One can take these questions in any number of ways. Nevertheless, we can address these types of questions specifically to SR, because both of these authors’ endeavors can be accounted by the significant event. The problem with Harman is his discourse relies and draws upon ideas that are taken as given for their ability to make their arguments. In other words, the objects of past authors, their thesis and ideas and such, are indeed touching Harman so that he can use theirs to support his ideas, despite his problemitization of how it can be so, and, the objects he is using to situate his thesis appear to be touching. He appears thus to be drawing from some aspect or element undisclosed to his argument, some element that is not an object, so he can thereby make his argument that all reality is constituted by objects, and thereby propose a real-true system. I suspect that his system stems from the same maxim that I have proposed, ie. there is nothing beyond discourse, and transcribes, as I do, ‘terms’ as ‘objects’; he thereby develops a system of relating objects to account for reality. But his thereby seems to suggest that the route I propose in my essays is more salient, accounting for more of the facts, because any scheme relating objects at most describes a particular real moment, a particular conventional True Object in necessary opposition to another True Object, and at best describes the individual in reality. Granted, he is making a statement that will go in the annals of conventional philosophy, but we will leave him for now in his own right to fill out the object of reality.

The problem with Miessaloux appears for now little more suited to irony. His argument is that math relays the truth, and that the situation of math thereby gains a true-real situation of the individual. He suggests that it is a particular type of reasoning that gets in the way of seeing the reality that is the truth of math. From this he proposes that there are things that exist outside of thought, things he calls ‘arch fossils’, for example, skeletons of dinosaurs suggest that there were living creatures that relied upon such skeletons that existed before humans began to think about them, things that exist anterior to humans thinking about them.

With this in mind, in the effort still to gain the meaning of the veto, next we consider Quentin Meillassoux, and then Matin Hiedegger, their ideas on science, in the following parts.


End part 4a

Author: landzek

My name is Lance Kair, a philosopher, a counselor and a musician who is being questioned.

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